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This thesis examines the case study of Jericho as an example of the unique 
challenges of intra-Palestinian water allocation.  Over the past hundred years, Jericho has 
been under the control of five ruling governments: Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Israeli 
and Palestinian.  This study begins with an investigation of local water allocation under 
foreign control.  Throughout each period of rule, legislation about water was inherently 
connected with land control, and Jericho’s history as an agricultural city dictated how 
water was classified.  Despite many of the nominal changes in law from one government 
to the next, local practice changed relatively little, as the community allocated resources 
in a fairly consistent way among community members.  Jericho’s sustained level of 
agriculture has been possible because of the consistently high output of a large spring, 
Ein Sultan, just north of the contemporary city.  The second chapter examines the 
transition from Israeli to Palestinian control of Jericho in 1994, which is now considered 
an Area A zone in the West Bank, and examines the relationship of nascent Palestinian 
 vii 
water institutions with previous informal networks. The last section addresses the 
challenges facing Jericho today, referencing and analyzing the recently written Master 
Plan for Jericho’s water system undertaken by a Palestinian nongovernmental 
organization. The Plan effectively highlights problems within the system of allocation, 
including: poor water quality, inefficient domestic and irrigation networks, conspicuous 
local consumption, ineffective pricing systems, and lack of wastewater treatment. 
However, the plan does not provide long-term suggestions to address the underlying 
systematic problems with the allocation system.  Although Jericho is theoretically a 
Palestinian controlled municipality, it faces serious obstacles to effective governance of 
its resources.  The informal institutions dominated by the agricultural sector that 
sustained the community for such a long time, may not be able to adjust in the face of 
necessary water reform for the city.  The local government may need to consider 
politically unpopular decisions, reform tariffs, and decrease reliance upon foreign aid if it 
hopes to continue maintain and manage Ein Sultan and other water sources for the 
growing city into the future. 
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Jericho claims to be the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world, with the 
earliest indication of a settled community dating back to the Natufian culture, circa 9200 
BC.1 In an arid region that is largely inhospitable to settlement, Jericho is blessed with 
nearby groundwater and spring water, which have contributed to its resilience in face of 
environmental, political, and economic changes.  Its largest spring, currently known as 
“Ein Sultan,” has provided the greatest and most constant supply of potable water to the 
Jericho region for many years.  While the contemporary city of Jericho is located some 
miles south of the spring, the original settlement was directly next to this important 
source of life.  Because of its importance as a basic human need for the creation and 
maintaining of human civilization, the presence and control of water necessarily 
influence who holds power within a community.  The control of Jericho’s water supply 
remains an important factor in power relations and the functioning of the city eleven 
millennia after the founding of its original settlement. 
 In many human civilizations, crop irrigation consumes more water than domestic 
uses, so farmers have traditionally played an important role in the control of water 
resources. The shift during the modern period from rural to urban centers has changed the 
pressures of allocation from irrigation to domestic water.  The changes that have occurred 
within Jericho represent, in miniature, the larger conflicts within societies across the 
Middle East, as forces of “modernization” and political change have vied with traditional 
cultural norms. For example, in the past century alone, the city of Jericho has been under 
the rule of five different governments.  This paper examines how these changes in the 
                                                 




governing structure of the city affected the management, allocation and use of water 
resources. 
This research will not take up the highly contentious and increasingly dialectical 
issue of water allocation and use between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
This often-debated theme has become emblematic of the larger conflict between the two 
and will undoubtedly be a primary negotiating point of any future peace agreements.  
However, in order for this study to be fully contextualized, it is necessary to briefly 
recognize the realities of this litigious debate.  Although there is more or less a scientific 
consensus about what technically needs to be accomplished so that water can be 
efficiently and safely harvested, treated, and distributed, the international and domestic 
political challenges make such achievement much more complex.  Human rights groups 
and multilateral organizations alike have documented the challenges of a system in which 
Palestinians consume significantly less water per capita than Israelis. As reported by a 
2007 World Bank study:  
Water withdrawals per capita (gross water withdrawals divided by the population) 
were calculated in 1999 as 190 [liters per capita per day] lpcd for West Bank Palestinians, 
about 1,000 lpcd for Israelis, and about 870 lpcd for settlers. By 2007, availability had 
declined, and the Palestinian population had access to only about one quarter of the ration 
of their Israeli counterparts: West Bank Palestinians had about 123 lpcd, and Israelis 
about 544 lpcd.2 
 
                                                 
2 World Bank Report, No. 47657-GZ, “West Bank and Gaza: Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian 
Water Sector Development.” (Apr. 2009), 13. 
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Palestinians, Israelis and third parties disagree about facts, responsibilities and for 
addressing these challenges in water allocation.3  Some authors utilize the topic of 
Israeli-Palestinian water allocation and consumption as an example with which to argue 
their chosen angle about the conflict.4 Some analysts argue that water is inherently a 
source of conflict, whereas others claim that it instead provides unique opportunities for 
cooperation and acts as a stepping-stone toward peace.  Despite the multitude of opinions 
and narratives about the implications of cross-boundary allocation of water between 
Palestinians and Israelis, comparatively little has been written about the present situation 
of internal allocation within a Palestinian community in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. 
Domestic water allocation and its implications within the Palestinian Authority represent 
a topic that has been under-studied.   
This thesis examines water allocation in Jericho, a municipality in the West Bank 
that has been controlled under the auspices of the Palestinian Authority (PA) since the 
transition of civil and security control of the city from Israel in 1995.   This paper 
addresses some of the challenges and prospects of water allocation and distribution 
within a Palestinian controlled framework. Given the truly intertwining nature of the PA 
and the Israeli government and their history, it would be difficult to completely divorce 
the influence of Israel in the region. However, this thesis seeks to elucidate internal 
Palestinian water allocation, a field under-represented in the literature, rather than focus 
on cross-boundary interactions.  The report begins with an examination of the previous 
                                                 
3 see the Israeli government’s official response to Amnesty International’s piece entitled “Troubled 
Waters- Palestinians Denied Fair Access to Water” in which the Israeli government denies all claims 
against it, relying on counter-evidence. Hard facts are used by both sides and can easily be bent to favor 
one position or another in such heated debates. 
4 For several examples of books that take up this issue see: Jan Selby, Water Power and Politics in the 
Middle East: The Other Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2003); Alyn R. Rouyer, Turning Water into Politics: 
The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (2000); and Miriam R. Lowi, Water and power: The 
politics of a scarce resource in the Jordan River Basin. (1995). 
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systems of water administration.  In the past one hundred years, Jericho has been under 
Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian control.  This rapid succession of 
control has affected the gradual formation of practice and patterns of use within Jericho.  
In many cases, even after a period of rule ended, practices and laws created under the 
previous ruling government were restated, modified slightly, and left in place by the 
following government.   
The study will then move into existing framework for water allocation in Jericho 
as illustrated by a Master Plan for the municipality organized by a prominent Palestinian 
nongovernmental organization. The plan addresses formal and informal water allocation 
institutions, which indicate priorities of local development.   
The Palestinian state, despite the appearance of authority, remains a weak state 
even within areas, such as Jericho, in which it has nominal control. The actions and 
practices of the members of a society can often be far removed from the laws as they are 
written.5  This paper examines this phenomenon by exploring not only the challenges, 
but also the prospects of allocation within the municipality, as a means for better 
understanding of water management issues in a state grappling with weak and developing 
infrastructure.  
                                                 
5 See Joel Migdal’s theory of the state in society presented in Strong Societies and Weak States: State-




Jericho: The “oldest, continuously inhabited city in the world” 
Jericho is perhaps best known throughout the world for the Biblical narrative in 
which Joshua fights the Battle of Jericho and destroys the city and its inhabitants.  After 
crossing the Jordan River, Joshua and his followers came upon Jericho as the first major 
city of Canaan. As instructed by his God, Joshua and his army marched around the walls 
of Jericho once a day for six day and on the seventh day circumambulated it seven times.  
During the final circuit, the priests of the Covenant blew their horns and the soldiers 
sounded their battle cries. The walls came crashing down, allowing the Israelites to 
successfully invade the city.  According to the narrative, Joshua’s forces destroyed 
Jericho and all of its inhabitants completely: men, women and children alike, all save the 
prostitute, Rahab, who had aided the Israelite spies, and her family.
6
  After Jericho’s 
destruction, Joshua warned that any man who attempted to rebuild the damned city would 
forfeit the lives of his children.
7
 Detailed archaeological analysis of the site has 
documented that the city of Jericho was deserted at the time of the Israelite conquest of 
Canaan.
 8
  However, the story of “Jericho’s walls coming crashing down” remains an 
integral part of Christian theology and the dramatic events are ingrained in the minds of 
young and old, believers and non-believers alike. When an individual living outside the 
region hears the name “Jericho,” it is likely that some variation of this Biblical narrative 
is what comes to mind and not the present-day city in the West Bank. 
                                                 
6 Joshua 6: 1-25. 
7 Joshua 6: 26-27. 
8 Bar-Yosef, O. “The Walls of Jericho: An Alternative Interpretation. Current Anthropology. 2.2, (Apr, 
1986), 157.  
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It is significant that the city of Jericho was included as the location for the 
Israelites first battle.  Jericho was recognized as a key city of the region and a visible 
marker of pre-Israelite society.  While the dramatic and miraculous crumbling of the 
walls may be historically inaccurate, excavations of the city have shown that main 
characteristics of the city included structural oddities for its time: relatively high outer 
walls and a tower.
9
  What allowed the civilization at Jericho to prosper in ways that were 
impossible for other settlements in the area?  A key factor must have been its access to a 
constant and reliable water source.  
Jericho also figures prominently in the Biblical narrative of the prophet Elisha, 
who came to a contaminated spring near Jericho at the request of the people, to purify its 
waters by sprinkling salt into the spring, cleansing it of all disease and making it potable 
for generations to come.
10
   Ein Sultan is likely the same spring; to this day, some refer to 
this spring north of present-day Jericho as “Elisha’s Spring.” This second Biblical 
narrative highlights not only the importance of access to a water source for successful 
settlement, but also the concrete danger posed by polluted water for settlements.   
The concern for both water quantity and quality are not limited to the distant past. 
In the twenty-first century just as it was millennia ago, the control over allocation and 
quality of water is still dictated by and often determines power structures within a 
community.  Polluted water poses a threat for the health and economic well-being of 
individuals and the community as a whole and must be addressed for the society to 
flourish.  In the story of Elisha, it takes no less than a prophet to save the water, and by 
extension the people of the region who depended upon it. 
                                                 
9 Bar-Yosef, O. “The Walls of Jericho An Alternative Interpretation.” Current Anthropology. 27.2 (Apr. 
1986), 157. (Note: this author actually proposes that the famed walls of Jericho were built to protect the 
city from the unpredictable flooding and mudflows from Ein Sultan, rather than to protect it from some 
enemy) 
10
 2 Kings 2:21 
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The concrete implications of the spring for the town are evidenced by Jericho’s 
resilience in the face of sociopolitical and environmental challenges impeding continued 
inhabitation of this small city.  While many Old Testament cities and towns are now 
nothing but excavation sites for archaeologists and tourists, Jericho remains one of the 
few cities that have withstood the test of time.  The city and its inhabitants have not been 
immune to the changes in leadership and the influence of outside forces.  However, 
Jericho’s continued existence, despite Joshua’s Biblical admonition, demonstrates the 
city’s self-sufficiency and resilience throughout the years.   The flow of Ein Sultan has 
been measurably constant for nearly a century. A British survey conducted in 1936 
measured Ein es Sultan’s yield at approximately 600-700 cubic meters an hour, much the 
same as it is today.
11
  The evidence of pre-historic settlement demonstrates that the spring 
has been sufficient to sustain settled populations for millennia.  The remarkably constant 
output of the spring has undoubtedly been one of the primary sustaining factors of the 
city.   
While other towns may have withered away as seasonal precipitation patterns 
changed, or seasonal climatic variations shifted, Jericho’s source of water was constant 
enough to sustain its inhabitants through these potentially devastating changes, both 
environmental and socio-political. The following section provides an overview of 
Jericho’s water resources, as its natural resource wealth is a primary reason for its 
longevity. 
 
                                                 
11
 Gottman, Jean. “The Pioneer Fringe in Palestine: Settlement Possibilities South and 
East of the Holy Land. Geographical Review. (Oct 1937), 558. 
 
8 
Geographic and resource overview 
Jericho is located within the Jordan River Basin, approximately twenty kilometers 
from the Jordanian border in the northern region of present day West Bank.  The Jordan 
River Basin is part of a series of rift valleys, stretching from Syria into the Rift Lakes of 
Africa, and this geological fault line affects the hydrological resources of the Jordan 
River Basin.  In addition to the water from the Jordan River itself, the area surrounding 
Jericho has an abundance of groundwater, located in both shallow and deep aquifers, 
accessible through a series of naturally occurring springs that mark the area. Throughout 
recorded history, the spring Ein Sultan (or “spring of the Sultan” in Arabic), located just 
north of the present-day city has provided a constant and sufficient supply of water to the 
residents of Jericho. A study conducted by the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) 
reported that Ein Sultan’s recharge area is quite far from the discharge area, as is 
evidenced by the notable difference of composition between the rocks around the 
discharge area of the spring and the quality of the spring itself.
12
   
The spring is one of the largest in a chain of springs in the area fed from aquifers 
located in the Judean Mountains to the East.
13
 The distance between the recharge zone 
and the spring, as well as the substantial size of its storage area, contribute to its 







  That is the equivalent to the amount of water needed to fill just over six 
Olympic sized swimming pools each day.  The groundwater that comes to the surface at 
Ein Sultan has remained the main source of water in Jericho today.  Despite the proximity 
of the city to the Jordan River, the municipality does not have the authority to utilize any 
                                                 
12
 Jericho Draft Master Plan, PHG. 3.1 “Conventional Water Resources (surface and 
groundwater)”, 21. 
13 Andrew Sherratt (2004), 'Sites from Satellites: Jericho, Jordan', ArchAtlas, February 2010, Edition 4, 





of its water because of Israeli restrictions, as only a limited number of specific residents 
of the Jordan River Basin are allowed access to its waters. As per the stipulations of The 
Jordan-Israeli Peace Treaty signed in October 1994, water from the Jordan River is 
allocated between Jordan and Israel with specific amounts entitled to each that vary 
during the summer and winter periods.
15
  There is no explicit allocation of water from the 
Jordan granted to Palestinians.  The treaty signed about a year later between the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, grants the Palestinians general 
water rights, but does not mention the Jordan River specifically.
16
 
Jericho is also situated between two large systems of wadis, valleys or dried 
riverbeds that channel floodwaters and other runoff during certain periods of the year, 
Wadi Qilt and Wadi Nwaimah (alternatively spelled Nu’eima depending on the 
transliteration from Arabic to English).  Wadi Qilt extends to the west of the city and 
Wadi Nwaimah runs north of it. The average annual total flow of each total 1.4 million 
cubic meters (Mcm) and 0.945 Mcm respectively.
17
  Jericho does not rely on this runoff 
to supplement its water resources, although some local individuals have created small-
scale harvesting projects in the wadis for individual use such as gardens.
18
   
Compared to other regions of the West Bank, Jericho has access to significantly 
more water resources than many of the cities further in the north, such as Tubas and 
Tulkarem, which often suffer severe water shortages.
19
  Even larger cities such as 
Bethlehem and Ramallah face seasonal shortages, in which running water may only be 
                                                 
15 The Jordan – Israel Peace Treaty. (26 October 1994)  Annex II, Article I. Accessed via Allan, JA. 
Water, Peace and the Middle East Negotiating Resources in the Jordan Basin. New York, 1996, pp, 216. 
16 The Israel- PLO Interim Agreement (28 September 1995). Accessed via Allan, JA. Water, Peace and the 
Middle East Negotiating Resources in the Jordan Basin. New York, 1996, pp, 227-34. 
17 PHG Draft Master Plan Jericho. 3.3 “Non Conventional Resources.” 24 
18 Bsharat, Jalal. Personal Interview. 28 Jan. 2012. 
19 “Water for Life.” Palestinian Hydrology Group, WaSH MP. (2007-8), 49. 
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available once every two weeks for a household.
20
  Given this relative abundance, Jericho 
has a long history of settlement and agricultural activity.  The ways in which resources 
are currently allocated are closely tied with historical economic priorities and 
sociopolitical institutions. 
 
Ottoman Era: 1516-1918 
The Ottoman Empire controlled the area of Palestine in at least a nominal 
capacity for over four centuries, from 1516-1918.
21
  Despite this broad stretch of rule, 
power remained decentralized for the majority of the outside rule, and there is limited 
research about areas in the periphery, such as Jericho.  As is evidenced by the portrayals 
of Westerners at the time, Palestine was often cited solely as an historical land of the 
Bible, without considering the daily socioeconomic and political realities of the area.  
Until recently, the literature has been dominated by the problematic dichotomous 
distinction between pre-modern and modern (i.e. after contact with Europe) Palestine.
22
 
Existing texts focus mainly on top-down political organization of the Empire and changes 
thereof.  While in the past several decades, the study of pre-nineteenth century Palestine 
has begun to broaden, significant gaps remain in published information on the daily lives 
and practices of Jericho’s residents during the Ottoman period. This gap in the literature 
is especially important because within the decentralized nature of Ottoman Palestine, the 
strong local ties in villages, cities and clusters of cities were more telling than the broadly 
imposed retrospective categorizations of life in the city.
23
  Details about small towns like 
                                                 
20 Qannam, Ziad. Personal Interview. 14 June, 2011. 
21 Biger, Gideon. The Boundaries of Israel-Palestine Past, Present, and Future: A Critical Geographical 
View.” Israel Studies. 13.1 (Spring 2008), 70. 
22 Doumani, Beshara B. “Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into History.” Journal of 
Palestinian Studies. 21.2 (Winter 1995), 6. 
23 Doumani, “Writing Palestinians into History,” 16. 
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Jericho, aside from the occasional, personal commentaries and locally inspired narratives, 
leave much to be desired for the researcher interested in informal institutions and internal 
politics, such as those governing water use, especially in rural areas, for which obtaining 
information is especially difficult.
24
 
Prior to the Ottoman period, there was little centralized control, or formal written 
laws governing the allocation of water in Palestine.  Agreements were generally made 
within a community, specifically within the prevalent tribal (i.e. extended familial) 
structures in which members divided access to water internally for domestic and 
agricultural use. While informal institutions have persisted until today, the imposition of 
outside rule and formal laws governing practices affected the ways in which land and 
water were recognized and allocated.  Given the primacy of agriculture, control and 
allocation of water was closely tied with laws governing the land. During the early 
Ottoman period, land was awarded as a result of conquest, and the dominant system 
resembled feudalism.  Technical “ownership” in such cases had little to do with who had 
traditionally or historically lived and worked on the land, but instead was nominally 
possessed by a small group of Ottoman elite. The land laws theoretically demarcated 
lands based on its use and location comparable to the city as detailed below: 
…the theory underlying land law was that all land was owned by the Sultan 
by right of conquest, with the exception of waqf [religious endowments 
inherited from family members]  and mulk [land adjacent a private resident] 
land. All the lands owned by the Sultan, comprising arable fields, meadows, 
summer and winter pasturing grounds, woodland and the like, were termed 
miri. This was specifically a term used to define lands within a given 
village, whereas the areas between villages and those used for civil works 
like roads, were considered matrouk.  Outlying areas that held little potential 




                                                 
24 For an example of such a personal history written by a local see:  Shihadah, Fawziyah. Ariha: 
dirasah hayadariyah. (1985). in Arabic. 
25




From these distinctions, it is noteworthy that Ottoman law differentiated between 
lands which were arable and those that were not.  While these land laws did not 
specifically enumerate the ownership of water resources, the presence of water resources 
changed the nature of the classification of the land and its level of interest for the Empire.  
The majority of Palestinian land was technically owned by the emir, or prince, and 
therefore was in a special class of land known as emiri.
26
 
However, the Ottoman version of a feudal system did not prove to be either an 
effective way of taxing the population or producing from the land, and it was replaced in 
the early nineteenth century by a system of tax farming in which the peasantry was often 
exploited to the benefit of the government intermediaries.
27
 When this system also failed 
in its objective of efficient taxation, the Ottomans established a Land Code through which 
ownership of land was officially granted by the government to individuals who paid a 
specified fee for its use.
28
  The miri lands that constituted the majority of Palestine were 
therefore owned by individuals with the right of their ownership acknowledged by the 
Ottoman government.  These reforms were characteristic of a broader trend throughout 
the Ottoman Empire to reform and modernize in the face of competition from the 
increasingly threatening European powers.  However, many of the reforms remained 
superficial, and actual practice continued much as it had for centuries.  The felahadin 
(peasant farmers) did not immediately change their practices of land and water use or 
adopt reforms dictated from above.
29
  This gap between law and practice would continue 
to be a dominant factor of use of water in the region for years to come.  
                                                 
26
 Shehadeh, Raja. The Land Law of Palestine: An Analysis of the Definition of State Lands. 84 
27 ibid. 
28
 ibid. 85. 
29 Nadan, Amos. The Palestinian Peasant Economy: A Story of Colonial Bungling (2006). 
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During the Tanzimat period beginning in the early nineteenth century, the 
Ottoman government attempted a series of reforms in a bid to maintain its regional power 
after suffering a series of embarrassing defeats at the hands of European powers.  While 
primarily centered on modernization of the military in the center of the Empire, the 
reforms also sought to modernize other aspects of the Empire in the periphery.  At that 
time, Jericho was located within the Sancak of Jerusalem, a part the larger Ottoman 
provinces that combined historical Syria and Palestine.  The predominant economic 
activity of the region was agriculture; however, despite declared initiatives on the part of 
the Ottoman government, there was little real reform in this sector.
30
 While patterns of 
classification for natural resources changed, the use of these resources remained fairly 
constant.  The state had little success implementing reforms further away in the 
peripheries of the Empire, especially in rural areas. 
While it is clear that reforms may have carried little weight in Jericho and other 
parts of the periphery of the Empire, it is possible to speculate on the conditions for water 
allocation in the city.  The water of Ein Sultan was channeled through a system of canals, 
or qanat, to various areas of the city for agricultural and domestic consumption.  
Although there is no specific information about the families that lived in the city, these 
extended familial networks would have most probably been the primary method of 
organizing who within the community accessed water and when.  Often, towns that 
depend upon a spring established a rotating system of allocation, in which each of the 
main families of the community had access to water for a given period of time before it 
moved to the next family. Water in the region is often still allocated by units of time, as a 
vestige of this basic system of sharing. This allocation network often operated with the 
                                                 
30
 Ma’oz, Moshe. Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine. 1840-1861. The Impact of the Tanzimat on 
Politics and Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. 163. 
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opening and shutting of gates within the qanat system.  Among this larger network of 
families, water was then divided into allocation for individual members as deemed 
necessary.  Powerful families and clans definitely had greater water privileges, and 
conversely those who controlled this allocation schedule must have wielded considerable 
weight in the sociopolitical fabric of the community itself.  These assertions about the 
structure of Jericho’s water sector are based on reports of other cities in the region, as 
well as the vestiges of the system that were noted later, rather than concrete reports from 
the period. 
Small towns of the periphery of the Ottoman Empire were also subject to raids by 
the Bedouin and the farmers of Jericho, like many other small towns and settlements, 
faced these added obstacles to maintaining a successful and stable existence centered 
around agriculture.
31
  Often described as an oasis, Jericho must have made a rich target 
for these raiding bands.  The blessing of abundant water in a largely arid region obviously 
did not come without complications for the town.  However, despite the plethora of 
challenges facing the success of agriculture in the city, it remained the chief economic 
activity of the time.  This ingrained importance of agricultural activity has implications 
for the future of the city, as is discussed in following chapters of this thesis. 
 
British Mandate Period: 1922-1947 
After the Ottoman defeat in World War One, the victorious Allies negotiated the 
future of territories of the former Empire, and paid particular attention to Palestine.  After 
several rounds of revisions, and input from American, British and Jewish interests 
(notably leaving out direct representation of the interests of Arabs living in the area), the 
                                                 
31
 Ma’oz. 132. 
 
15 
final draft of the Mandate for Palestine was approved by the Council of the League of 
Nations in the summer of 1922.
32
 In 1924, an amendment was added to the Mandate 
rescinding British power over the areas recognized as “Trans-Jordan” to the east of the 
Jordan River.
33
  However, Jericho and its surrounding areas remained under auspices of 
the British mandated “Palestine.” (see Figure 1.1) 
Figure 1.1 The Borders of Mandate Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
 
Source: Dartmouth Middle East Maps Collection: “Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 
1922” <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/pal-transjrdn-1922.gif>. 
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In many other parts of its Empire, the British selectively supported local leaders, 
and thus ruled by proxy; this was not the case in Palestine.  The British did not encourage 
and support existing, traditional, tribal leaders within Palestine; instead, they ruled 
directly from Jerusalem without the support of local strongmen.
34
  The relatively laissez-
faire attitude of the British toward Palestinian political institutional capacity-building not 
only created a power vacuum that was advantageous for nascent Jewish institutions, but 
also had significant consequences for the future abilities of any Palestinian state.  The 
problem of decentralization and lack of cohesiveness of Palestinian institutions, 
specifically the water sector will be discussed in detail in the coming chapters. 
During the Mandate era, the British maintained many of the land and water laws 
from the Ottoman Code, although, they modified the laws to fit the British style of 
imperial governance. The reforms that were implemented were only those deemed 
necessary for “efficient governance” of the territory.
35
  The British did, however, 
decrease the land taxes levied on the fellahin from the taxes enforced during Ottoman 
rule, by combining various taxes levied by the Ottomans into a flat ten percent land tax.
36
 
As one author points out, the most important changes made by the British during this 
time were administrative policy changes, which in fact proved useful after transition to 
Jordanian rule. In addition to the changes in the tax code, the British reopened Ottoman 
registries that had been closed after World War I.
37
  By making such administrative 
improvements, the British were attempting to quantify and organize systems of 
ownership and allocation that were haphazard and informal.  
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The Order-in-Council of 1922 that began the Mandate period introduced of a new 
category of land, “state land,” which the Order classified as: “all lands in Palestine which 
are subject to the control of the government of Palestine by virtue of Treaty, Convention, 
Agreement or Succession and all land which are or shall be acquired for the public 
service or otherwise.”
38 
 This way of defining state land seems to have been 
unprecedented in the region.  Despite the nominal change, the notion of land and its 
resources as public goods as defined by the British remained a foreign concept. Land 
categorized as “waqf,” or religious endowments, often provided public services, 
including fountains and public water access points.  However, these  waqf endowments 
were still privately managed and their actions were considered to be charity rather than 
public goods.   
Under the British Mandate, water was managed and consumed much as it had 
been under Ottoman rule. Inequalities existed between water-rich and water-poor actors 
within this traditional framework of allocation.  However, this privately operated 
informal system created a framework that stood the test of time and was remarkably 
resilient to changing structures of government and formal power. Within a small 
“irrigation community” that collectively shares its water resources, the individuals are be 
more likely to consider the entire community and share in the droughts and surpluses 
equally.
39
  This terminology is particularly relevant for Jericho, as the family networks 
that controlled allocation of this irrigation community were all invested in and tied to the 
successes and failures of the allocation system as a whole.  While more politically 
powerful members with greater clout may have enjoyed a greater percentage of the 
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The Mandate Era was also marked by increased archeological expeditions, 
attempts to survey the land, and the beginnings of tourism.  The British fascination with 
Palestine is reflected in the plethora of surveys and teams sent to the “Holy Land” during 
the Mandate era.  Even before the Mandate had been officially approved, there were 
expeditions sent into the region to determine the possibilities for development and 
settlement. The number of Westerners traveling to Jericho as either explorers or religious 
pilgrims increased significantly during the Mandate period, and travel logs and reports on 
Jericho of the time reflected a negative perception of the small town.  Hoping to 
encounter idealized versions of picturesque Biblical towns, British pilgrims were 
distraught to find the people living in what they considered abject poverty. Many were 
put off by the lack of hospitality they felt their excursions warranted.  One British travel 
book predating the Mandate stated: “The inhabitants of Jericho are obtrusive, and the 
women have not the best reputation. The traveler should be on his guard against 
thieves… The inhabitants, about 300 in number, seem to be a degenerate race, on whom 
the hot and unhealthy climate has had an enervating effect.” 
41
  While this language may 
seem unseemly for readers today, its tone typifies the general attitude of British travelers 
and explorers to the people of the region.  Ein Sultan is also mentioned as a daytrip of 
interest because of its importance in the Biblical narrative of the prophet Elisha.
42
 
In addition to their interest in Jericho’s role in Biblical lore, the British remained 
interested in it and surrounding areas because of perceived potential for agricultural 
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development.  In 1923, as part of a larger survey of the territory, the British sent a team to 
map in and around Jericho for the irrigation of state lands.
43
 The British set about 
establishing many centers for agricultural development and research throughout Palestine 
during the Mandate Period.  With the classic imperial mentality of “saving the backward 
Palestinian peasants” from the ignorance and neglect of the Ottoman period, and the 
fellahin farming techniques, the centers incorporated research and innovations from 
across the British Empire in order to improve the agricultural techniques and output of 
Palestine.
44




The British saw the potential for great agricultural advancement in Jericho and the 
surrounding lands.  One surveyor reporting on the possibilities of settlement in Palestine 
described Jericho as “an islet of greenery in a red and yellow waste.”
46
 The method of 
water distribution at the time consisted of a channel connecting Ein Sultan to the fields of 
the fellahin.  The “state” supervised the allocation of the water to each of the eight 
divisions of the land that received this allocation every twenty days.  Although, the open 
canal, or qanat, system was not considered a marvel of modern technology, the author 
heralded this process of distribution for its ability to decrease the mosquito population 
that was such a perennial problem in the humid area.
47
   
As late as 1930, fifty-three percent of the settled population in Palestine was 
engaged in agriculture and the fellahin produced approximately ninety percent of the 
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vegetables during the Mandate.
48
 Therefore, improving the yield of the agriculture was of 
great importance for the British and they established a research institution for agriculture 
in the Jericho area.
49
 The British had high hopes for the project; one British prospector in 
1937 went so far as to compare the possible yield of the Jordan River Basin area to that of 
the Nile.
50
  Although the flow from the Jordan was indeed considerably higher at the 
time, such high hopes were obviously extrapolations, ignoring the important hydrological 
and agricultural differences of the two riparian areas.  There were also systematic 
problems with the implementation of these reforms, as described by Amos Nadan in his 
study of the Palestinian peasants under the Mandate era: 
Irrigation with easily accessed water could have developed further if certain 
institutional constraints had not existed. Under the official Mejelle law, inherited from the 
Ottomans, the government owned all the water. This law dealt with upper-ground water, 
the main source of free water. The practice was otherwise, however, since the 
government did nothing to enforce the right until 1944 and not much after that. 
Consequently the custom that the landlord who had water on a plot of land also owned it 
was the de facto law.
51
 
The British legislation, in other words, lacked the necessary mechanisms to 
enforce its policies and therefore lacked legitimacy in practice. According to Nadan, the 
Mandate government only supported irrigation reform superficially and did little to 
actually change the way that water allocation functioned before the Mandate. The 
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Mandate government ultimately failed to create a lasting infrastructure for irrigation and 
water allocation that would have been an economic boon to the region.
52
 
A British irrigation engineer, Dawson Shepard, updated the system of water 
distribution in 1929 for the first time since the Herodian era aqueducts had been built.
53
  
Commenting on the perceived ineffectiveness of irrigation from these springs, Shepard 
stated: “It is a difficult thing to prove but, on observation, one is forced to the conclusion 
that little more than 20% of the water originating from the springs does useful work.”
54
  
Despite the British efforts to reform the irrigation and agricultural practices of Palestine, 
to a large extent they failed. The agricultural centers represented to Palestinian resistance 
fighters a symbol of the British power itself and were therefore targeted during anti-
imperial campaigns. The Jericho agricultural and experimental station itself was targeted 
and badly damaged during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939.
55
  A retroactive report 
indicates that despite the considerably large amount of resources that the British poured 
into these stations, that: “probably very little impress of any lasting value was made on 
the Arab community because of its own inherent problems, economic conditions, culture 
and political events as they unfolded.”
56
  These ill-fated attempts by the British 
demonstrate that the policy of imposing “expert” advice upon communities, even if 
grounded in empirical experimentation and research, fail when the needs and practices of 
the community are not considered.  The British had great faith in the power of education 
and technological advancement, but the ultimate failure of their project demonstrates that 
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a one-way, top-down approach to education will do little to improve the long-term habits 
and engrained cultural patterns of consumption. 
In 1947, the British government made the decision to withdraw from Palestine, as 
part of its larger project of de-imperialization after World War II.  The United Nations 
then sent a delegation, the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which was 
tasked with determining what to do with the troubled area.  The twenty-five years of 
British control had little effect on the institutions of water allocation and agriculture in 
Jericho.  Despite lofty rhetoric and goals to advance Palestine through technological and 
infrastructure development, little of this came to fruition because of the Mandate 
government’s inability to carry through with its promises of advancement to “modernity.”  
By the end of this quarter-century, the institutions and systems of water allocation in 
Jericho looked much the same as they did before the British arrival. 
 
Jordanian Period: 1950-1967 
Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Jordan took control of the West Bank of 
the Jordan River as part of the Armistice Agreement with Israel.
57
  The annexation 
formally occurred in 1950, transferring 5,642 square kilometers or 5,633,000 dunums to 
Jordanian control, which lasted until 1967.
58
  (see Figure 1.2) 
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Figure 1.2 Map Showing West Bank as part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
 
Source: UT Map Collection. “Jordan” (Shaded Relief, 1972) 
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/jordan_rel_1972.jpg> 
 
While local Palestinian governance had been largely untouched by British 
policies, Jordanian rule changed the centers of power.  Palestinian national movements 
that had begun under British rule faded out as most of the positions of power (such as 
mayorships and representation in the capital, Amman) were awarded to the traditional 
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Because both Jordan and the West Bank had been under British rule for a period 
of time, the land policies were relatively similar and facilitated an easier transition of 
power for the territory, than may have otherwise been anticipated.
60
   
Whereas water settlement came much later than land settlement in the East Bank, 
growing awareness of the importance of irrigated lands to the national economic 
convinced Jordanian officials to settle water rights in the West Bank from the outset. In 
fact, the first settlement announcement issued by the lands department in 1952 concerned 
not land but water rights in Jericho.
61
   
From that point forward, the Jordanian government settled water rights in the 
West Bank at the same time as land rights.  In an effort to improve the structure of 
taxation in the West Bank, the Jordanian government attempted to revamp the structure 
of water rights.  Instead of linking water rights to units of time corresponding to the 
amount of irrigated land one owned, the government attempted to tie water to land.
62
  
However, the Jordanian government soon realized that it was difficult to change 
ingrained attitudes and habits regarding water allocation within a community, and that 
some people continued to have a disproportionate access to water.
63
 During the Jordanian 
period, the government continued a policy of selling and leasing state land, including 
land along the Jordan River Valley that had not been settled during the British Mandate.
64
   
Much of these areas consisted of lands that had formerly been classified under special 
categories such as state land, or land owned by the Ottoman sultan personally.
65
  This 
reversal of Ottoman and British land laws demonstrates, to an extent, the gradual shift 
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from classification of state lands to increasingly privately controlled land and natural 
resources in Jericho and the rest of the West Bank. 
The Jordanian administrators drew upon both British and Ottoman precedent and 
policies for taxation, land mapping and administration.
66
  The Jordanian period of rule 
was considered a period booming growth and infrastructure development for many cities 
and towns in the West Bank.
67
  Although new settlements did not develop in the area of 
the Jordan Valley and along the Dead Sea due to environmental challenges and the 
scarcity of water, the comparable oasis of Jericho flourished.
68
  Despite the geographical 
and climatic extremes that made growth difficult in much of the rest of the surrounding 
region, Jericho, blessed as it was with a constant source of water, was one of the few 
cities in the Judean Desert that did thrive, growing seventy-three percent during the 
seventeen years of Jordanian rule.
69
  In addition to its advantageous water resources, 
Jericho benefited from the political change, because it was located on the road between 
Jerusalem and the rest of Trans-Jordan, which became more widely traveled after 1950.
70
  
As a result of the West Bank’s inclusion into the greater Trans-Jordan, and the changing 
system of roads and communication, the road undoubtedly did affect the growth of the 
city.  However, without the steady supply of water provided by Ein Sultan, this growth 
would have been short lived at best.  The growth of Jordanian rule in Jericho was 
primarily spurred by the creation of the Armistice Line between Israel and Jordan and the 
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money coming from Palestinians working in the Gulf, rather than deep economic 
development that resulted in sustainable economic opportunities in the region itself.
71
   
Despite these elements of growth in Jericho, the level of individual debt also 
increased during the Jordanian control of the West Bank.  In Jericho, registered private 
debt rose by an order of magnitude from 16,708 JD (Jordanian Dinar) in 1954, to 167,074 
JD in 1966.
72
  This trend occurred because during the period of Jordanian rule the land 
value of the West Bank increased and therefore farmers and other landowners could 
borrow more money against their more profitable land.
73
  This conundrum demonstrates 
one of the most basic paradoxes of the period.  The increased economic activity meant 
that residents of Jericho and similar towns began to realize a higher standard of living; 
however, these changes were not supported by deeper institutional development to 
support this growth.  This disparity is particularly problematic for the water sector, as 
patterns of consumption and demand grew much more quickly than the infrastructures to 
support sustainable supply.  
During the 1950’s and 1960’s the Jordanian government was also engaged in 
irrigation projects designed to capture and utilize available water resources more 
efficiently.  Because the majority of Jordan is more arid than the generally dry climate of 
the West Bank, the irrigation projects were primarily limited to the areas on both sides of 
the Jordan, within the Jordan River Basin.
74
  While some areas within this Basin utilized 
water harvesting from the seasonal runoff in systems of wadis (seasonal river valleys), 
the wadi systems of the West Bank of the Jordan were not as suitable for these sorts of 
                                                 
71 Efrat 111 
72 Fischbach, 502. 
73 Fischbach, 502. 
74 Davies, H.R.J. “Irrigation in Jordan.” Economic Geography. 34.3 (July 1958), 264. 
 
27 
government funded irrigation projects and therefore were not as commonly found.
75
   
This remains largely the case today, as Jericho makes little use of runoff from wadis, and 
is discussed in greater detail later.  In the Jericho region, there have been some small 
wadi runoff harvesting projects, but to a large extent, this water source continues to be 
largely underused.  
The irrigation projects funded by the Jordanian government in and around Jericho 
were of a different nature.  One author described Jericho in 1956 as a “veritable oasis” 
with “its many date palms.”
76
  The irrigation scheme in Jericho served the large 
surrounding area for a total number of beneficiaries estimated at 55,000 people and 
irrigating about 4,000 dunhams or about 988 acres.
77
  These irrigation programs focused 
primarily on the production of water intensive, cash crops, such as citrus fruit, cucumber, 
cabbage and cauliflower.
78
  Jericho, however, at the time was known for its date and 
banana growing industries.
79
  These water-intensive cash crops could only be grown in a 
few very select parts of the West Bank because of climatic variables as well as access to 
adequate water.  These differences in the possibility of crop cultivation were even more 
notable when comparing the effect of irrigation around Jordan’s capital city of Amman 
and the water rich area surrounding Jericho.  
Table 1.1 indicates the comparative consequences of irrigation on crop yield in 
the sub-district around the capital of Amman and the Jericho region. The crops that could 
be grown in Jericho were much more diverse than those that could be grown in other 
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parts of Jordan, and irrigation yields in Jericho far exceeded yields in the capital of 
Amman. 






Jericho sub district 




17.78 kgs 80 per 
dunam 
354.00 kgs per dunam 
Tomatoes 
304.80 kgs per 
dunam 





Grains 91 52 





Source: Davies, H.R.J. “Irrigation in Jordan.” Economic Geography. 34.3 (July 
1958), 271. (originally calculated by Davies from data found in the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan Statistical Yearbook, 1955, Department of Statistics, Amman) 
Bananas and other fruits and vegetables were seen as cash crops comparatively 
more suitable for the humid and hot climate of Jericho than the arid climate of Amman. 
However, these crops are also highly water intensive, calling into question the economic 
sustainability of diverting so much water to foreign crops to be sold for cash and export.  
Although Jericho was comparatively more water-rich than other parts of Jordan, it lacks 
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the tropical excess of water of the environments in which bananas often grow. The 
economic investments during the Jordanian period of rule have ramifications for water 
allocation policy even today, with the prioritization of agriculture over domestic use, and 
the unwillingness to consider new sources of economic activity.  The team investigating 
the irrigation projects in 1956 grappled with this very concept, concluding its mainly 
descriptive analysis with a question for the future: “The main problem left to be solved 
would appear to be an economic one. What crops of sufficient value can be grown in 
order to make the scheme pay for itself?”
81
  The implications of those decisions will be 
examined in more depth in the last chapter. 
 
Israeli Control: 1967- 1994 
Israel took control of the West Bank (as well as the Golan Heights from Syria and 
the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt) following the defeat of the allied Arab forces in the Six 
Day War of 1967.  Despite the widespread perception by Palestinians that Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank has been mainly negative, there were some important 
organizational and institutional reforms made during this period.  Jericho was one of the 
towns in the West Bank whose infrastructure greatly improved during the time of Israeli 
control.
82
 During the beginning of Israeli occupation, the Israeli government viewed the 
development of Palestinian institutions dependent upon Israel for support as a good 
economic and security investment. 
After 1967, Jericho, like many other towns in the West Bank, was struggling to 
provide adequate and quality services to its residents and requested Israeli aid and 
technical support to develop its networks.  Although Palestinian mayors initially accepted 
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and even sought out Israeli financial aid for development projects and infrastructure 
building, they became less willing to do so as time progressed and nationalist tendencies 
encouraged them to disengage from Israeli aid.
83
  Israel supported development in the 
West Bank, but a very specific kind of development aimed at improving its own 
economy.  The West Bank provided not only a new market for Israeli goods, but also a 
source of comparably cheap labor. 
The Israeli government also enforced specific laws about the kinds of economic 
activity that could be conducted within the West Bank.  In 1983 when Jericho was under 
the jurisdiction of Israel, the Israeli army issued Military Order No. 1039, which made it 
illegal for any person to grow vegetables in the Jericho district without specific 
permission from appropriate Israeli authorities.  Although the stated aim of this order was 
to preserve water, it damaged the Palestinian agricultural sector, which had previously 
employed a large percentage of the Palestinians in the area.
84
 Unregulated agriculture is 
still forbidden in portions of the West Bank, mostly Area C, a distinction that will be 
explained in the next section, and Israeli soldiers routinely destroy “illegal” farms.  
However, after the transition of power from Israeli to Palestinian control, Jericho no 
longer faces these restrictions on agriculture. 
With the integration of the West Bank into the Israeli economy, Israel had specific 
goals, parallel to those of the British aimed at increasing the productivity of the land, 
especially within the agricultural sector.
85
  Israel’s Master Plan for the West Bank made 
these priorities clear in its mission statement:  
The underlying ideas of the proposed Master Plan are: development of 
agriculture for export; the urban development of Jerusalem and its satellites 
with a proportional growth of the various other towns in the area and their 
                                                 
83 Moshe, 142. 
84
 Amnesty International Report. 13. 
85  Abu-Ayyash, Abdul-Ilah. “Israeli Regional Planning Policy in the Occupied Territories.” (1976), 96. 
 
31 
adequate industrialization; the settlement of the unpopulated Jordan Valley 
and the Dead Sea area and making it arable; the expansion of agriculture 
wherever possible; utilization of available ground water resources; the 
clearance slums and refugee camps; the development of the economic rural 
functions of the bigger villages; the improvement of inland and air 
communications; the utilization of the tourist potential of the area for the 
benefit of the entire country; and the development of the periphery of 




Several of these goals dealt specifically with the use of water and how to best exploit the 
water resources of the West Bank for Israeli economic advancement.  Therefore, although 
there was considerable growth in the realm of institution building during the Israeli 
period of rule, these developments were made with the stated intent to enhance the 
economy of Israel.  When the time came to transfer power in Jericho from Israel to the 
Palestinian Authority, the governmental institutions in place were not those created to 
benefit autonomous Palestinian governance. 
 A 1993 newspaper report, directly before the transfer of power from Israeli to 
Palestinian control, gave voice to some residents of Jericho and their mixed reaction to 
the agreement. Many residents of Jericho heralded the agreement and the possibilities 
they saw for greater political freedom and economic investment with general enthusiasm.  
Others, however, were wary of an agreement that would give only a small part of the 
Palestinian homeland.87 Whereas many of the previous governments ruled from their 
own centers of power, which were physically and often socially removed from the area 
being governed, the period of Israeli rule in Jericho was different.  For better or worse, 
decisions made during this time in the area affected Israeli economic, political, and 
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security interests. Therefore, the frameworks guiding governance, institutions and water 
allocation that the Palestinians of Jericho inherited were those set-up to benefit specific 
Israeli and not Palestinian interests.  It had been in the best interest of the Israelis 
governing Jericho to ensure that any Palestinian institutions, including the water sector, 
were dependent upon Israeli support; so when the transition to Palestinian control 
occurred, the water sector was relatively undeveloped. 
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 Chapter Two 
Jericho under the Palestinian Authority 
 The peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the 
1990’s, generally termed the “Oslo Accords,” began with a reciprocal recognition of 
legitimacy between the two parties, led to a Declaration of Principles, and finally 
established the framework for an “Interim Period” in which power would gradually be 
transferred from Israeli to Palestinian control in certain areas.88  Jericho was one of the 
two areas from which Israel began this transition immediately, as per the stipulations of 
the Gaza-Jericho Agreement signed in May of 1994.89 Although the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement addressed the main principles and framework for the transition of power, the 
plan was put into effect by the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and 
Responsibilities signed in August 1995.  Reflecting on that agreement later the same 
year, Raja Shehadeh described the primary challenges of the operation of the Palestinian 
state in the first months after Israeli withdrawal:  
Under Article II of the August 29 agreement, Israel has agreed to transfer 
‘powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil 
Administration in the West Bank in the following spheres: education and culture, 
health, social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and Value Added Tax on local 
production…’ Thus Israeli military government, and its attendant Civil 
Administration, continues to exercise power in the West Bank except for those 
‘powers and responsibilities’ turned over to the [Palestinian National Authority] 
PNA. The scope of the transferred powers is based on Jordanian laws (pre-June 
1967) and Israeli military orders issues over the course of the occupation, some 
of which are illegal from the point of international law.90   
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This observation recognizes that the nascent Palestinian encompassed a mixed bag of 
laws and military orders from previous governments, which would prove problematic for 
the effective governing of a state. Shehadeh goes on to note that further stipulations in the 
law did not transfer the correlating management of budgetary decisions to the 
Palestinians for these “powers and responsibilities” due to security reasons.91 The status 
of many Palestinian laws, therefore, can be tenuous at best or confusing not only for 
those who study them, but also those who are supposed to implement and obey them. 
 In 1994, the Israeli government began the process of withdrawing both civil 
supervision and security forces from the areas of Jericho and the Gaza Strip as a step 
toward a more complete peace agreement and transfer of authority.  Eventually this led to 
the creation of three distinct classifications of Palestinian land in the West Bank. Jericho 
became an “Area A” municipality in which the Palestinian Authority (PA) is responsible 
for both civil administration and security.  Under Area B the PA controls only civil 
affairs and Israel deals with security.  Area C remains under complete Israeli security and 
civil jurisdiction. (see Table 2.1)  Figure 2.1 provides a map of the classification of land 
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Area A Palestinian Palestinian Jericho, Bethlehem, Ramallah, 
Hebron 
Area B Palestinian Israeli Abu Dis and Sawahera 
Area C Israeli Israeli All Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank 
 
Since 1994, Jericho has been self-governed, in at least theory, and should therefore may 
serve as an example for future Palestinian administration and management of water 
resources.  However, theory contrasts with practice in important ways.  While nominally 
a Palestinian controlled municipality, Jericho still operates within a larger system of 
occupation, and therefore faces many of the same constraints of more formally controlled 
areas.  For example, unlike a municipality of similar size operating within Israel, Jericho 
faces considerable challenges including the lack of a reliable transportation infrastructure 








Figure 2.1 Land Classification according to Oslo Agreement 
 
Source: Palestinian Hydrology Group.  
“Geopolitical Maps.” <http://www.phg.org/maps.asp?map=7> 
 
 The Oslo Accords set out only the most basic framework for future negotiations 




Organization. The original agreement was intended only as an interim set of negotiations 
lasting for five years, after which there would be a reconsideration of several of the main 
issues of contention between Israel and Palestine, one of which was the question of water 
rights.
92
  However, the peace process as a whole has stalled. What was intended 
originally as an interim agreement continues to be the de facto framework guiding many 
joint issues between Israel and the West Bank, including water allocation. 
 Details for the specific transfer from Israeli to Palestinian civil and security 
control in designated areas were laid out a year later in the Gaza- Jericho Agreement.  
This Agreement details the transition of security arrangements, civil affairs, legal matters 
and economic relations in the city of Jericho and the Gaza Strip.
93
  Annex II of the 
agreement dealt specifically with the transfer of civil operations, and included relevant 
provisions including: agriculture, land registration, nature reserves, public works, water 
and sewage, planning/ zoning and environmental protection.  The section on water and 
sewage states that all water systems and resources in Jericho and Gaza, with the 
important exception of existing Israeli settlements and Israeli military zones, would be 
transferred to the management of the Palestinian Authority for maintenance and 
development.
94
  The first part of the section lays out the framework for a “Joint Civil 
Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee” and recommends the creation of 
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similar subcommittees to address the transition and coordination of services between the 
two authorities.   
 The Water and Sewage section includes a specific recommendation that “the two 
Parties shall establish a subcommittee to deal with all issues of mutual interest including 
the exchange of all data relevant to the management and operation of the water resources 
and systems and mutual prevention of harm to water resources.”
95
  This recommendation 
has led to the creation of the Joint Water Commission (JWC) that includes 
representatives from both Palestinian and Israeli water sectors.  New water projects in the 
West Bank require the approval of the JWC, which can be a lengthy and complicated 
procedure at best.  The frustration with this institution, viewed by Palestinians working in 
the water sector as an ineffective and inequitable establishment, is palpable.96 Projects 
that are planned within Area C regions require the additional permission of the Israeli 
Civil Authority.  Jericho, as an Area A municipality, is spared this additional level of 
bureaucracy. 
 While some analysts hailed the Oslo Agreements as constructive steps in the 
peace process, critics claim that these agreements changed little in the status quo and had 
only superficial consequences.  For example, Jan Selby specifically addresses water 
management within the Oslo framework and challenges the widely accepted narrative 
that Oslo I and II made significant gains for both sides that were subsequently lost with 
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the Intifada of 2000. Selby argues that the Accords simply perpetuated Israeli Occupation 
and domination of Palestinian resources under a different name, and that management of 
resources by Israeli and Palestinian institutions have been largely unchanged despite 
Oslo.97  He does, however, recognize that even the illusion of progress significantly 
increased the amount of foreign aid and investment coming to the Palestinian territories, 
specifically to the West Bank. This foreign assistance spurred by the Oslo Accords 
decreased the burden on Israeli resources and encouraged development in the West Bank: 
“The Oslo agreements and process as a whole bestowed a new-found legitimacy on 
Israeli-Palestinian relations (or at least signaled a gradual move towards legitimation of 
these relations, the ‘peace process’).”98  While this aid comes with its own challenges, 
which will be discussed in more detail later, Oslo impacted the water sector within the 
West Bank and Jericho, even though it may be difficult to precisely quantify that effect. 
Institutions in Jericho 
 The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) established the Palestinian Water 
Authority (PWA) in 1995. The Water Law No. 2 stipulates that the PWA is to be an 
independent governmental organization that reports directly to the President of the 
PNA.99 Water Law 2 was revised in 2002, as Water Law No 3 declares all water 
resources, including waste water, public Palestinian property and therefore under the 
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protection of PWA.100  The PWA nominally has the duty to protect and oversee water 
resources, but lacks the people or procedures to manage water sectors on the ground.  
Instead, this responsibility was delegated to the “Local Authorities” via the Local 
Authorities Law No. 1.101   Therefore, local water management operates under a vague 
legal and political framework; for example, some “Local Authorities” include non 
governmental rather than official actors.102  This dynamic is important, because the 
framework for water management can be unique within each Palestinian municipality, 
and can include non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), often categorized as 
environmental nongovernmental organizations (eNGO’s).  Whereas eNGO’s in Israel 
focus largely on research and advocacy, their Palestinian counterparts often are the 
institutions providing services and resources to the population en lieu of effective 
governmental institutions. 
 Power to control the water within at the municipal level in Jericho is manifest in 
several different groups, governmental and nongovernmental, within Jericho’s society 
that wield considerable sociopolitical and economic influence in the town and its water 
sector.  Trottier uses Jericho and the control of the Ein Sultan spring water as an example 
of the dichotomous tension between the traditional landed elite and new elite made up of 
the increasingly large population that worked outside of the agricultural sector.  With a 
population boom in the late nineties, the farmers were still receiving the same “hours” of 






water, but the quantity had decreased significantly.103  As a result of this tension, the 
farmers bonded together to create the “Ein Sultan Water Users’ Association” 
(ESWUA).104  The agreement stipulates that farmers are entitled to fifty-eight percent of 
Ein Sultan’s output and domestic users are allotted forty-two percent.105   This agreement 
has not been modified since its creation, despite the fact that the municipality’s demands 
have “forced” providers to informally increase the domestic consumption ratio.106  Due to 
the political connections of its members, the ESWUA gained permission by decree in 
1998 to be the provider and regulator of Jericho’s domestic and irrigation needs. The 
following year, the municipality announced that it did not recognize the validity of the 
ESWUA’s decree.107  This tension between the farmers who still exercise considerable 
amount of power through the ESWUA and the nascent formal governing institutions of 
the PA continues to be problematic today. 
Demographic Information about Jericho under the PA 
 As of the official 2006 census, Jericho has the smallest population of any 
Palestinian governorate, with just over 43,000 residents.108  In contrast, the next populous 
governorate, Tubas had just over 48,000 residents, and the most populous governorate of 
Hebron contained about 543,000 residents.109  These numbers reflect each governate as a 
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whole, and the governate of Jericho contains an additional eleven other localities, ten 
considered “rural,” one (in addition to Jericho itself) considered “urban,” and two refugee 
camps.  Although there has not been a formal census since 2006, estimations calculated 
by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) for the city of Jericho itself are 
projected to now be in the range of 20,000, whereas population for the governate is 
estimated to be around 48,000.110 It is important to keep these population differences in 
mind when attempting to extrapolate information about Jericho to the broader Palestinian 
situation.  While Jericho is a useful case study because of its Area A status and its relative 
wealth in terms of water resources, its small size still makes it unique. 
 When dividing the total domestic use with the population connected to the 
network, the per capita domestic consumption within Jericho is actually markedly higher 
than in the rest of the West Bank.  Whereas the master plan shows that per capita 
consumption in Jericho calculates to be approximately 292 liters per capita per day 
(l/c/d), the norm in the greater West Bank is a low 70 l/c/d.111  When estimating per-
capita water consumption, the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) also had to consider 
the water volume used for “conspicuous consumption” including the amount used from 
the domestic connection for such relative luxuries as: irrigation of household gardens, 
swimming pools, and cooling systems. The PHG report, however, is careful not to point 
blame for the high domestic consumption solely on patterns of use of the populace:  
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For the sake of objectivity, these water practices cannot merely entirely be 
considered as reckless behavior since the extremely elevated temperatures do in 
fact require much higher use of water to sustain a healthy life.112 
 
Despite its plentiful water sources, the Jordan River Basin is also an extremely hot 
location in which to live.  Jericho is located about 400 meters below sea level and mean 
summer highs are around 37.6 ˚C (100 ºF).  
 After excluding swimming pools and other elements of conspicuous consumption 
from the equation, the PHG revised down its per capita domestic consumption estimates 
to be closer along the lines of 134 l/c/d.113  The decision to make this revision is 
questionable, given that total domestic consumption usually does include all of the 
extraneous sources of domestic water consumption that go beyond fulfilling the most 
basic of needs. Even after the seemingly arbitrary exclusion of certain uses, the remaining 
consumption is still almost twice as high as elsewhere in the West Bank.  At this time, the 
Municipality of Jericho and the PHG lack the resources to effectively map out water 
consumption more specifically so as to determine how domestic consumption patterns 
differ between individual consumers from various socioeconomic subsets of the 
population. 
Economy of Jericho 
 As is the case for many towns in the region with Biblical importance, tourism 
remains a main source of income in Jericho.  A short driving distance away from the 
Dead Sea, Jericho also hopes to further develop its domestic and international tourism 
                                                 




industry through the marketing of this Dead Sea connection as well as proposed 
ecotourism around the Jordan River Basin.
114
  The number of tourists in the city has 
climbed markedly in the past several years, despite a decrease in overnight stays caused 
by increased Israeli checkpoints and difficulty crossing the borders.115  A telling sample 
shows that from the month of February in 2009 to the same month in the following year, 
the number of visitors in Jericho climbed dramatically from approximately eighty 
thousand visitors to one hundred and fifty thousand.
116
  The Municipality of Jericho 
hopes to encourage this increasing trend of tourism in the future. 
 Despite a few good years for tourism, it is difficul to extrapolate conclusions 
about the future of the tourism sector for Jericho. Political instability in the region, and 
the unpredictablity of future unrest mean that tourism in Jericho is a highly volatile 
industry for individual tourists, investors and officials alike. Regardless of the volatility 
of the industry, officials within Jericho still focus on its potential to bring increased 
economic activity into the region.  This focus on the expansion of the tourism industry 
represents not only a major development opportunity for the municipality, but also a 
serious challenge.  Tourists, especially international tourists hailing from first-world 
countries, are more likely to consume a greater amount of water per capita, and managing 
this increase will undoubtedly put a great stain on the existing framwork for allocation. 
 Agriculture represents the largest single consumer of water in the West Bank, 
especially within the areas surrounding Jericho.  Whereas agriculture in Israel is highly 
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mechanized, and “high-tech,” agriculture in the West Bank remains largely subsistence 
farming.  Although the GDP related to agriculture is comprably small in both areas (2.4% 
of Israel’s GDP and 3.7% of the West Bank’s), the percentage of the labor force 
employed by the industry is significantly greater in the West Bank, in which an official 
twelve percent of the population is engaged in agriculture.
117
 This twelve percent likely 
does not take into consideration the number of women and children who work 
unofficially in household economies by assisting with domestic agriculture.   In Jericho 
specifically, agriculture involves not only those who rely upon it for the entirety of their 
income, but also many who have small scale garderns or other jobs in order to make a 
living. For example, a recent survey reported that 38.5 percent  of the farmers in Jericho 
surveyed by the PHG said that they rely on the private sector for their main source of 
income.118 
 Other sectors of the economy are increasingly becoming more important in 
Jericho, but agriculture nonetheless consumes the most water.  Although Jericho is in the 
running for the creation of an “industrial” zone, no such developments have yet been 
achieved.119 It is the largest of the governates in size, and has many resources to offer, but 
its small and largely rural population inherently favor agricultural economic activities to 
industrial.  Because other aspects of Jericho’s economy are not as well developed as the 
agricultural sector, there is no existing data on the breakdown of use by sector at this 
time. 
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Jericho and its neighboring Refugee Camps 
 Another complicated demand for water comes from the two refugee camps near 
Jericho, the Ein Sultan Refugee Camp, located northwest of the city and the Aqbat Jabr 
Camp, located to the south.  Figure 2.2 illustrates the location of the two refugee camps 
relative to the city of Jericho. 
Figure 2.2 Ein Sultan and Aqbat Jabr Refugee Camps (Mukhayyam) 
 
Source: UT Library Map Collection. “Jericho and Vicinity.” 
 
 While the Ein Sultan Refugee Camp pumps directly from the spring, it is actually not 
under the jurisdiction of the municipality of Jericho.  Instead, the United Nations Relief 
 
47 
and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNWRA) administers water for the over 
1,900 refugees within the camp.120  All of the households within the camp are connected 
to a water network; however, water shortages, especially during the summer months, 
remain a primary challenge for the camp and its inhabitants.121 
 Ein Sultan Refugee Camp pumps water from the spring before it enters the 
network, but the Aqbat Jabr Refugee Camp receives water via the Southern water tank 
within the domestic network. The amount that the camp receives from the municipality 
falls far short of what is needed for the 6,400 refugees who live there. Although in 2009, 
the camp should have received about 500 m
3
/ day, it was actually receiving a mere 127 
m
3
/ day, according to the PHG. The UNWRA notes this among other problems when 
detailing of the current situation of water allocation and shortages within the camp: 
“While all shelters are connected to public water and electricity 
infrastructure, water scarcity is a major problem in this desert area. During 
the summer months, residents face severe water shortages which cause 
tremendous hardship. UNRWA is able to provide some water to the camp by 
pumping it from a nearby spring, though the Israeli water company Mekerot 
is the main supplier of water to the camp. There is no storm water drainage, 
and during heavy rains, water floods residents’ homes.”122 
 
The situation of Aqbat Jaber and its relationship with the Municipality of Jericho are 
emblematic of a larger problem across the spectrum of Palestinian society.  Navigating 
who is responsible for the allocation of water within these ambiguous communities that 
are at once controlled by the international community and no one at all will continue to 
be a challenge for Palestinian self-governance in the foreseeable future.  
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Jericho as compared with other models of water allocation in the West Bank  
 It is useful to compare the situation for allocation within Jericho and that of 
several other towns of the West Bank in order to more fully understand some general 
trends of water allocation and where Jericho fits in this framework. Julie Trottier 
addresses the key challenges and pressures of equitable and efficient water allocation in 
the West Bank by examining two villages with significantly different water sharing 
structures, specifically focusing on the different interactions and decisions regarding their 
relationship with the established Israeli water infrastructure.  Jericho’s system shares 
characteristics with each of the two examples, but also represents a unique framework 
because of its location, resources, history, and politics.  This level of institutional 
uniqueness and local specificity exists among the towns and cities within the West Bank, 
and therefore need to be considered more closely when attempting to manage water 
allocation within the region. 
 The village of Marmayya, located near Jerusalem, relies on six springs, all of 
which (at the time of Trottier’s field research in 1999) were controlled through a complex 
informal social network. In a common means of traditional water sharing in Palestine, 
each of the eight main tribes had access to the water sources on a rotating basis and 
divided the water internally between members of their family unit or tribe.123  Although 
the village was connected in 1972 to the Israeli water company, Mekorot, control over the 
sources has remained much the same and the village has maintained a substantial degree 
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of autonomy.124  The village of Falamiah, in the northern West Bank relied on rain-fed 
agriculture and small individual cisterns until the late 1950’s, when wells were first 
drilled, an event that changed the political capital and social organization within the 
village.125  Those who could afford to fund the drilling of a well subsequently controlled 
access to it, and those who could not were directly vulnerable to the whims of the price 
hikes of the owner.126  Jericho relies much more on its spring, like the first example; 
however, the municipality has only been tangentially connected to Israeli water lines.  
 Through these two examples, Trottier highlights two contrasting trends 
concerning the allocation of water in the West Bank.  On one hand, there is a trend 
toward decentralization, or as Trottier puts it “centrifugation,” in which changing 
methods of allocation and division of responsibility empowers actors other than the 
Palestinian state.  On the other hand, an opposite trend, or “centripetal dynamic,” as 
Trottier terms it, also occurs when the changing paradigms favor increased centralization 
and greater power of the PWA and by extension the PA in general.  Jericho has 
experienced elements of both decentralization and centralization, and that these 
competing forces prove to be a major stumbling block for the development of water 
management in the city today.  The traditional landed elite, as manifest within the 
ESWUA, is a decentralized force in Jericho representing the concerns of agriculture at 
the cost of domestic and commercial development. Ongoing efforts of the Municipality 
of Jericho to centralize and normalize their control over water allocation of the city have 
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been hindered by the traditional decentralized powers. The tension between these forces 
will be examined in more detail within the next chapter and the conclusion. 
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 Chapter Three 
Analysis of Jericho’s System of Water Allocation 
 
 With this socioeconomic and political background of Jericho established, this 
report now examines the specific framework for water allocation within the municipality 
and the challenges that impede successful development.  Although Ein Sultan provides 
enough water for the entire city, how it is actually delivered to the city is complex and 
problematic. The waters of Ein Sultan are divided between the main domestic network 
and irrigation pipelines, traveling generally north-south and west-east across the entire 
city.  However, the allocation is more complex, as inefficiencies are prevalent and real 
consumption patterns differ from officially recognized allowances. This section relies 
heavily on the Master Plan for Jericho organized by the Palestinian Hydrology Group 
(PHG), which is the first and only attempt to create a comprehensive overview of the 
water sector in Jericho, its problems and possible solutions.127  The findings and 
suggestions of the plan are examined under the framework of past successes and failures 
in the city’s long history as well as the sociopolitical and economic condition of Jericho 
today. 
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Methodology of Jericho’s Master Plan 
 The draft master plan for Jericho was created with the cooperation of various 
organizations, especially the Palestinian Hydrology Group and a cooperative partnership 
with the municipality of Paris.  The stated goals of the project are:  
reinforcing water production and distribution capacities and modes, reinforcing 
the water Department’s municipal management capacities, assisting the 
Municipality in implementing a public-awareness campaign for more rational 
water use, and assisting a local water governance reform process.128 
 
The goals of the Master Plan reflect the ambitions of the broader Palestinian water 
sector, but its recommendations are also limited in scope because of limitations such 
as funding, which are detailed later. 
 Prior to the study in 2011, there had not even been a comprehensive map of 
Jericho’s water users or patterns of use.  The Master Plan was the first time geographic 
information systems (GIS) had been used for the city to measure and plot data points to 
effectively visualize the system as a whole. The municipality of Jericho lacked a 
hydraulic model of the city and therefore could not effectively plan any new projects or 
determine how changes might affect the system as a whole.  Hydraulic models are used 
mainly in measuring use, determining how possible changes will affect the system by 
measuring it on a small scale. Before the Master Plan, the water engineers could only 
measure consumption of major users in the city and then would have to approximately 
divide the remaining consumption among the number of domestic users. A main success 
of the Plan has been to establish better mechanisms and tools for future planning projects.  
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Funds from the Municipality of Paris to build a hydraulic model for Jericho will enable 
engineers in the future to measure the impact of changes and map problems more 
efficiently.  This will have positive impacts for not only the maintenance and 
improvements for the current system, but also create a better atmosphere for urban 
planning in the future as well. 
 The plan, considered three categories of water consumers: households, 
agriculture, and industry. The PHG collected household questionnaires from a random six 
percent of the households within Jericho city limits.  Fifty-thee additional surveys were 
returned by farmers and thirty-three by industrial consumers.
129
  If the plan is successful 
in its endeavour, then it could serve as a model by which other municipalities can draw 
upon, especially in the wake of any future transfer of power from Israel to the Palestinian 
Authority.  However, it is important to note that this draft has only come to fruition after 
nearly two decades of independent Palestinian jurisdiction in the municipality.  The 
Master Plan for Jericho is the third such project undertaken by the PHG; hopefully, it will 
be promoted as an example for future Palestinian surveys. 
 The report also relies upon demographic information from the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics.  As is the case throughout the Middle East, the population within 
Jericho consists largely of youth, with approximately forty percent of the population 
fourteen years and younger.
130
  Refugees make up forty-three percent of the city’s total 
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population.131  These two sectors of the population alone indicate a highly volatile social 
environment, in which inequities and the lack of basic necessities, such as water, are apt 
to be felt especially strongly. 
Supply and Demand of Water in Jericho 
 Located in the comparatively water-rich Jordan Valley, the governate of Jericho 
has the highest average available water supply in the West Bank with access to 
approximately 3.61 million cubic meters (MCM) per year and a measured demand of 
about 2.36 MCM/ year.
132
  Whereas territories further south face significant shortages, 
Jericho is one of the few areas in the West Bank operating with what appears to be an 
adequate, even surplus, supply to meet its demands.  Despite its comparatively large 
quantity of water, Jericho still faces the challenges of providing an efficient framework to 
supply all residents with adequate and high quality water.  The challenge of transporting 
the water to consumers, dividing it in a fair and economically sound manner, and 
planning for growth and development of the city are nonetheless serious concerns for a 
municipality and water sector working with limited resources. 
 Jericho has the highest per capita water consumption within the West Bank, of 
174 liters per capita per day (L/c/d), and it is the only governate in which the water 
consumption is above the World Heath Organization's (WHO) Minimum Water Standard 
of 100 L/c/d. 133 The reasons for this high level of consumption reflect the available 
sources, the small population, and the hot climate.  In addition to Ein Sultan and other 
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springs in the region, there are also both shallow and deep aquifers in the Jordan Rift 
Valley, which can be accessed via wells and supply additional water for the area. The 
output from such wells, however, is more difficult to quantify, as fluctuations in output 
can vary dependent upon variables such as season, the rate of recharge, weather patterns, 
and the rate of extraction.  Because all major aquifers in the West Bank cross the Green 
Line with Israel, drilling of wells is a highly charged political subject.  Although Jericho 
does not rely primarily on water extracted from wells like other cities, the challenges of 
drilling and rehabilitating wells remains an obstacle. 
Management of Water Allocation within Jericho 
 The maintenance and upkeep of the physical systems of allocation and 
distribution fall under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Jericho’s Services 
Department, which includes seven sections, only three of which are directly related to the 
water sector: Water Networks Maintenance, Domestic Water and Irrigation Water. Two 
other sections of the Department are tangentially related (“Gardening” and “Health and 
Environment”); however, the PHG considers them outside the scope of their study, and 
the PHG report did not demonstrate their duties or attributes.  There is hypothetically a 
public awareness division within the “Domestic Water and Irrigation Water” section; 
however, this section has no employees, demonstrating the priorities of the municipality 
operating with constrained funds. 134  Jericho and other parts of the West Bank are busy 
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grappling with immediate and tangible water-related challenges, and public awareness 
campaigns are put on the “back burner” when there are limited funds. 
 Other problems inherent in the organization of the system include the lack of an 
employee to specifically control the irrigation schedule.135  As will be further detailed 
below, the irrigation network suffers from a plethora of problems, not least among them 
is the inability to properly coordinate use and timing of irrigation water to individual 
customers across varying supply lines. There appears to be little coordination across the 
system with other members of the government, a challenge within any bureaucracy, but 
especially so for a fledgling government struggling with resource management.  At the 
level of physical maintenance and upkeep of the network, there is also a paucity of 
technical expertise and manpower to sufficiently maintain the many pumps that are 
needed to keep water moving throughout the entire system.136  These problems ultimately 
reflect the immediate priorities of a department operating in a municipality with severely 
restricted funds.  With sufficient funds these vacant or understaffed positions could be 
filled and individuals trained. 
The Situation of Domestic Allocation 
 According to an agreement between the Municipality of Jericho and the Ein 
Sultan Irrigation Society, the distribution of Ein Sultan’s water is to be specifically 
allocated as follows: forty-two percent for the domestic sector and fifty-eight percent for 
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the agricultural sector. 137 The context for this sharing arrangement and the pressure 
exerted by the Ein Sultan Water Users’ Association (ESWUA) was detailed in the 
previous chapter.  Although its name implies that it represents all users of the spring’s 
water, agricultural interests still dominate the ESWUA.  The PHG reported was that of 
the total 650 m
3
/h flow of Ein Sultan, the amount currently allocated for irrigation is 
299.5 m
3
/h, leaving a remaining 350.5 m
3
/h for domestic consumption.  Subtracted from 
that amount is the approximately 20.8 m
3
/h used by the Ein Sultan Refugee Camp, before 
the water from the spring even enters the network.  Therefore, the total quota remaining 
for domestic use of Jericho is 329.7 m
3
/h.138   
Figure 3.1 Division of the Waters of Ein Sultan (Referenced here as Ain As Sultan) 
 
                                                 
137 PHG Draft Master Plan, 4.1 Current Domestic Water Supply and Use, 24. 
138 PHG Draft Master Plan, 2.0 Technical Assessment of Distribution Systems, 30. 
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Source: Palestinian Hydrology Group, Draft Master Plan, p 30. 
The distinction between domestic and agricultural allocation is less of a clear line than 
the initial agreement might at first appear.  Only some of the agricultural quota is 
received through the irrigation network, with the rest being satisfied through the domestic 
supply line.  The domestic network is comprised of nine main domestic pipelines which 
total about 156 kilometers in combined length.  The smallest of these pipes are only half 
an inch in diameter, whereas the largest are sixteen inches in diameter.139  Compared with 
massive pipelines that connect main lines in Israel and elsewhere, even the largest of 
these domestic pipes is small in comparison, demonstrating the truly local nature of the 
system as a whole.  However, the small scale of the pipelines corresponds with the small 
size of the community, which lacks the infrastructure to maintain even such a small-scale 
operation. 
 Measuring water passing through the pipes as well as water utilized by individual 
consumers is essential to efficiently manage the operation of the system as a whole and to 
equitably charge consumers for their services.  There are two types of meters used to 
measure water used in domestic connections, those that measure water by volume (i.e. 
volumetric meters) and those that measure it use by velocity.  At the time of the PHG’s 
survey, there were 4,597 individual house connections, the large majority of which (about 
83%) employed velocity water meters. Measuring consumption by the rate at which 
water flows is inefficient because it often does not reflect real use.  In other Palestinian 
cities in the West Bank, such as Bethlehem and Abu Dis, the problem of efficient 
                                                 
139 PHG Draft Master Plan, 3.1 “The Structure of the Domestic Water Distribution System.” 37. 
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measuring is perceived as especially problematic when consumers are charged for time 
rather than by volume.  In this system, households can be charged for goods that they are 
not even receiving, often due to seasonal water shortages.140  
 The large number of pumps needed to operate Jericho’s domestic network, greatly 
increase the cost of running the system as a whole because of the price of fuel and labor 
needed to maintain these outdated, inefficient pumps.  Because of the inefficiencies in the 
operation of the system as a whole, these pumps are often running at much higher than 
their intended capacity, thereby further increasing their running costs while decreasing 
their running lifetime.141   A report from the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) notes 
that despite Jericho’s high consumption rate and access to significantly more water 
resources, the governate still suffers from a twenty percent “Unaccounted for Water” 
(UFW) in the system.142   This means that the difference between the amount of water 
that enters the distribution system is 120 percent greater than the volume that is billed to 
the consumer, because of the leaks, pressure issues and other inefficiencies in the system. 
Irrigation Lines and Agricultural Allocation 
 The agreed upon quota for agricultural use of fifty-eight percent of Ein Sultan’s 
total 650 m
3
/h output totals 377 m
3
/h.  The PHG has measured that of this quota, 17.5 
m
3
/h of that water actually originated from the domestic water network.  The remaining 
amount is channeled through the four primary irrigation lines in the city referred to as A, 
B, C and D, running roughly west to east and southeast.  The lines are approximately 
                                                 
140 Qannam, Ziad. Personal Interview. 14 June 2011. Al Quds University. 
141 PHG, Draft Master Plan. 3.2 “The Performance of the Domestic Water Distribution System.” 39. 
142 “Basic Needs and Development: Ongoing and Proposed Projects by Governorates.” PWA. 113 
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thirty-five kilometers long, spanning most of the city and surrounding agricultural 
areas.143 An additional sixty m
3
/h is subtracted from the total irrigation quota in order to 
cover the cost of pumping, therefore leaving a total just under 300 m
3
/h to be divided, in 
theory, between the four main pipelines.144  The water that flows in the pipelines of the 
irrigation network have minimal treatment and flow from the main network lines directly 
to the farmers who can pay for the amount of minutes they would like to purchase and 
individual hydrometers measure the amount that each pumps.  The system as a whole is 
unsatisfactory for both providers and consumers, given its poor construction and overall 
level of inefficiency.  
  Just as the inefficiency of the pumps are a main problem in the domestic network, 
maintaining adequate water pressure is also a primary challenge for the irrigation lines. 
The water from Ein Sultan is pumped directly into the irrigation network with little 
pressure behind it and aversely affects the pressure of the entire system.  Hydrometers 
and flow meters installed throughout the system in order to ensure that farmers received 
the quotas that they paid for were calibrated only to operate above a certain level of 
pressure (3 bar) within the pipelines. PHG found that a strikingly high percentage of 
these hydrometers were operating below this minimum and therefore not effectively 
measuring or distributing quotas as they had been designed.145  Farmers, therefore, run 
the risk of paying for water that they are not receiving because the system is measured by 
time, and the operators are unable to ascertain how well the system is operating.  
                                                 
143 Palestinian Hydrology Group. Draft Master Plan, 32. 
144 PHG Draft Master Plan, 2.0 Technical Assessment of Distribution Systems, 30. 
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 The “EPANET” model used by the Jericho Municipality (see note) in order to 
measure the performance of the piping system, sets a higher quantity than can be 
tolerated given the quotas outline previously.146 While the quota is set at 299.5 m
3
/h 
among the four irrigation lines, the total quantity for the model presently being used by 
the municipality is 400 m
3
/h147, much higher than can be sustainable or effectively 
provided by the spring.  However, if the total quantity were to be reduced to a more 
sustainable level, then the number of hydrometers operating at pressure levels below their 
designed optimum capacity would skyrocket from 63 to 262, further decreasing the 
effectiveness of the network as a whole.148  These problems would mainly manifest in the 
lines C and D, which are located farther south than the other two, and therefore also a 
longer distance from the initial pumping from Ein Sultan into the network.  
 The system also suffers from a number of sub-par operational conditions, such as 
the lack of adequate water treatment, which subsequently makes it difficult for the pumps 
and meters to operate as they should, costing the city much money.149  Pipes are only 
designed to operate with a limited amount of particles in the water they transport. The 
inadequate treatment, especially within the irrigation network contains so much sediment 
that it damages the infrastructure of the network.  This poor water quality poses not only 
                                                 
146 This model is described on its website: “Developed by EPA's Water Supply and Water Resources 
Division, EPANET is software that models water distribution piping systems. It is a Windows 
95/98/NT/XP program that performs extended-period simulation of the hydraulic and water quality 
behavior within pressurized pipe networks.” EPANET “Software That Models the Hydraulic and Water 
Quality Behavior of Water Distribution Piping Systems.” < 
http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/wswrd/dw/epanet.html>. 
147 PHG, Jericho Draft Master Plan. 2.2 “The Performance of Water Distribution Systems.”, 35. 
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health and environmental risks, but also compromises the physical integrity of the 
pipelines.  These conundrums are emblematic of the problems of the system as a whole.  
Designed to operate a certain way, and forced to work in different ways because of 
systematic limitations, the technical aspects of the system last even less than they were 
designed. 
 Because water minutes can be independently owned and sold by those who “own” 
them, transactions often happen in which an owner, located on one pipeline sells his time 
to a farmer, on a completely different line. These independently conducted transactions 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to monitor and predict long-term use on each line and 
the hydraulic impacts of that use.150  The location of a farmer can impact the amount of 
water they are able to receive from the irrigation network.  To a certain extent, this is to 
be expected.  Those farmers at higher elevations, generally to the southern parts of 
Jericho, receive lesser quality water than those at lower elevations because of the 
problems with the pressure of the system.151  However, if a farmer further down the 
network is paying the same price for a given amount of minutes as a farmer closer to the 
source, he can effectively be paying more for less.  Disparities in ability to receive water 
depending on location is not, on its own, a problem; however, the failure of pricing 
systems to account for this difference has the potential to create real problems in the 
sector and the city as a whole. 
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Quality and Wastewater Problems 
 Jericho represents another often-overlooked aspect of water distribution in the 
Palestinian territories: quality.  The constant battle in the West Bank over questions of 
quantity means that the quality of water is often disregarded.  Although Jericho has an 
undisputedly higher quantity available than other areas, the quality of that water still 
leaves much to be desired and has serious negative impacts on not only the environment 
but also the health of the general population.  The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 
Monitoring Program (WaSH MP) of the Palestinian Hydrology group uses Jericho as the 
most prevalent example of wastewater mismanagement that plagues the entire West Bank 
and Occupied Palestinian Territories as a whole: 
The least developed governorate in regards to wastewater coverage in the 
West Bank is Jericho where the local population has no wastewater network 
coverage. It relies solely on cesspits and septic tanks. This is primarily due 
to the fact that historically development of a wastewater disposal network in 
the West Bank has occurred only in the largest urban centers. In addition to 
the relatively small size of Jericho (43,620 inhabitants), the city's geographic 
isolation has left it with limited services.152 
 
This report is several years old, but significant improvements in the wastewater system 
have yet to be made.  The Master Plan proposed the development of a wasterwater 
treatment plant in Jericho, but the start date for this planned project is not until 2015.153  
In the meantime, the residents of Jericho will continue to live without adequate 
wastewater facilities.  Wastewater treatment and reuse of “gray” water is a main source 
of water use, especially within the agricultural sector in Israel.  An efficient wasterwater 
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treatment plant and gray water re-use plan could greatly increase Jericho’s options for 
planning its allocation and the possibilities for redistributing the Ein Sultan water. 
Planning Challenges 
 The City of Jericho has many plans for future growth, all of which will increase 
the burden of the water sector. A major problem in the current water system is the lack of 
a comprehensive model of the domestic water network of the city, without which 
hydrologists and engineers cannot effectively plan for future developments that will 
affect the water sector. Therefore changes and additions may be made without 
consideration of the effect of those changes upon the network as a whole and its 
operations.154  Changes and repairs that are made often do not meet Palestinian Authority 
requirements, particularly those standards detailing the size and location of the trenches 
in which the pipes are laid.155  These shortcomings in addition to the poor quality of the 
water meters all increase the likelihood of increased intrusion of unfiltered water into the 
domestic network as a whole in the coming years.156  The city continues to grow, and 
with that growth comes new connections to the domestic network every year, thus adding 
to the overall strain on the system. While these short-term problems are evident, future 
problems are inevitable because of the general lack of adequate and comprehensive long-
term planning that seems to typify management in the city.   
 
                                                 





The Challenge of Funding 
 Many of the previous challenges facing the development of a well functioning 
system of water allocation enumerated above are rooted in the shortage of funds available 
to the municipality in general and specifically the water department. Outlining the main 
source of the problem of water allocation in Jericho, the Master Plan points to: “the lack 
of stakeholder cooperation in setting up a convenient system for the sharing, distribution 
and management of water, ever since the water and irrigation networks were 
rehabilitated,”
157
 which has subsequently led to further problems within the system such 
as equitable allocation among domestic and agricultural sectors.   
 Nearing the end of its second year of a three-year scope, the plan has received an 
extension of funds from the Paris municipality to construct a new pipeline with assistance 
from the Japanese aid agency.158  The implications of the city necessarily relying on such 
short-term aid projects to develop its water sector will be examined more fully in the last 
section. 
 The PWA maintains a list of both active and proposed projects underway for each 
municipality.  In Jericho, the primary goal is to improve efficiency in the existing 
network. Of the twenty-nine projects listed within the report; only twelve have secured 
funding (see the Appendix). 159  This crisis of funding is emblematic of the larger scale 
problem within the West Bank, not only to secure capital investment for projects, but also 
to ensure funding for the continuation of these projects and their long-term success. 
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 One of the main reasons for the water sector’s persistent funding problem is its 
failure to charge users for their services in a manner that would actually generate 
sufficient revenue to operate and maintain the system effectively. The Master Plan 
addresses the pressing issue of how to charge and collect money from domestic and 
agricultural consumers of water in an effective and equitable manner.  The main 
conundrum for the establishment of a tariff system is how to provide an affordably priced 
source of clean water that allows the populace access to the rudimentary levels needed for 
human consumption, while at the same time encouraging conservation and creating a 
framework in which to manage the city’s water resources.  At the moment, the 
municipality employs a “Increasing Block Tariff” (IBT) in which the unit price changes 
after a given amount of consumption (see Table 3.1). 
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Source: Palestinian Hydrology Group, Draft Master Plan. “Water Tariff and Fee 
Collection.” 47 
 
Consumption at or below twenty cubic meters is priced at 30 NIS (New Israeli Shekels), 
and consumption above that level is priced an additional shekel plus 10 NIS of tax. For 
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example, a customer consuming fifty cubic meters would be charged 70 NIS (the base 
rate of 30 NIS plus 1 NIS for each of the thirty additional cubic meters + the flat tax of 
10NIS).  
 While this IBT structure generally may be considered more equitable than a flat 
rate, in which poor consumers pay a disproportionately high share of their income, it still 
has its problems.  According to the PHG, 78 percent of consumers used amounts within 
the first bracket (0-100m
3
) above the minimum level of the existing IBT system, 
therefore indicating that the spectrum of levels is much too broad to effectively provide 
an incentive for conservation (see Table 3.2). 160 The levels within the current block 
system seem to have been established arbitrarily, without any consideration of the 
implications or efficiency of those limitations.  The report also mentions that employees 
of the municipality pay a further reduced price of 0.5 NIS for consumption within the 
first bracket.161  Therefore a government employee paying for the same amount as the 
earlier would pay only 55 NIS for fifty cubic meters of water (the base rate of 30 NIS 
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Source: PHG, Draft Master Plan. “Water Tariff and Fee Collection.” 47. 
 
Table 3.2 demonstrates that a large majority of the population are consuming within the 
first bracket.  By breaking up this first bracket into smaller blocks of consumption, there 
would be two benefits for the system: increased revenue generated from those who 
consume more and a disincentive for conspicuous consumption.  
 In order to reform the tariff system so as to more accurately reflect ability to pay, 
the PHG refers to a survey conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
that addresses “affordability” in water.  The EPA suggests an appropriate percentage of 
income to spend on water resources is around two percent and the PHG states: “, 3-5% of 
monthly income remains a widely accepted rate for general expenditure on water services 
for an average family.”162  However, after comparing the amount consumed among 
different income groups, the lowest income group is spending over nine percent on water 
within this first bracket.  In the summer months, the bottom two income groups spend 
over five and fourteen percent on water when it becomes more scarce and water is of 
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69 
greater need to maintain a healthy and comfortable living style.163  This problem is 
especially prominent among the agricultural families as they generally have a lower level 
of education, more children and a lower income than the average family in the 
municipality.164 
 To alleviate this disparity, the PHG refers to the EPA’s suggestion of creating a 
“lifeline” quantity that can be distributed to lower-income households at a reduced rate, 
after which the price can once again be raised to reflect the market value of the 
commodity.165  Therefore, the system can gain more revenue by charging those 
excessively using water higher prices, while maintaining an equitable and affordable 
bottom line to ensure that those on the bottom of the socioeconomic latter still have 
access to an equitable part of the areas resources.  These changes are likely to be 
unpopular with those within Jericho who consume greater amounts of water as they 
would pay more under a reformed increasing block tariff system. 
 The water department needs to gain approval from the Office of the Mayor if it 
hopes to implement any of the above reforms.  At the time of my interview with Jalal 
Bsharat, the chief water engineer for the city, the water department was having trouble 
with the Mayor’s Office about the necessity of making such a revision to the water tariff 
system.  In order for a change of this nature to be made, the Mayor’s Office needs to 
agree to the plan, and they fear the political repercussions of this for their future prospects 
and approval ratings within the municipality.  According to Bsharat, the Water 
                                                 
163 ibid 
164 PHG. Draft Master Plan. “Farmers’ Socio-Economic Background.” 63. 
165 PHG, Draft Master Plan. “Water Tariff and Fee Collection.” 50. 
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Department is suffering because of its inability to change the system and the subsequent 
shortages that this will eventually cause for all involved.166 
Proposed Suggestions of the Master Plan 
 The Master Plan divides its proposals into three phases: short-term, mid-term and 
long-term.  The short-term actions are the most straightforward and achievable (see Table 
3.3). 
Table 3.3 Short Term Phase Proposals of Master Plan 
Action  Objective Starting 
Year 
Rehabilitation of Samed 
groundwater Well  
Increase the rate of groundwater 
abstraction 
2012 
Drilling new groundwater well 
(New Jericho well) 
Increase the rate of groundwater 
abstraction 
2013 
Purchasing water from Ein Ad 
Duke At Tihta spring 
Increase the supply to the Domestic 
demand 
2013 
Construction of gray wastewater 
treatment Plants 
Increase the rate of water reuse for the 
domestic demands 
2012 
Demand Management actions Decrease the domestic demands 2011 
Network Maintenance Improve the domestic and agricultural 
networks, building reservoirs, installing 
pumps, improve the distribution regimes, 
training technicians, etc 
2011 
Source: Palestinian Hydrology Group. Jericho Master Plan Powerpoint presentation. 34. 
 
Many of the projects within this first phase have already been initiated, as the 
Municipality of Jericho has begun to acquire necessary permissions for well 
rehabilitation and negotiations for purchasing additional water from Ein Ad Duke.  The 
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above actions represent the suggestions of the Master Plan that are most likely to be 
quickly funded and achieved within the next few years.   With the exception of “Demand 
Management actions” most of these actions have easily measurable outcomes.  However, 
even within these short-term projects, there are ambiguities, especially within the demand 
management side of the equation.  These ambiguities become even more pronounced in 
the next two phases of suggestions. 
Table 3.4 Mid Term Phase Proposals of Master Plan 
Action Objective Starting 
Year 
Construction of Jericho waste 
water treatment plant (including 
collection network)   
Collection and treatment of generated 
wastewater in the domestic demands 
2015 
Construction of mixing tank To be used for mixing brackish 
groundwater with treated waste water 
2015 
Construction of gray wastewater 
treatment Plants 
Increase the rate of water reuse for the 
domestic demands 
- 
Demand Management actions 
(changing cooling systems, 
modifying tariff system, 
institutional reform) 
Decrease the domestic demands - 
Storm water Harvesting To utilize the storm water in wadis 2015 
Constriction of Brackish water 
treatment plants 
To utilize the brackish groundwater 2015 
Network Maintenance Improve the domestic and agricultural 
networks, building reservoirs, installing 
pumps, improve the distribution regimes, 
training technicians, etc 
 
 Source: Palestinian Hydrology Group. Jericho Master Plan Powerpoint presentation. 35. 
 
In this “mid-term” phase, represented here in Table 3.4, some of the projects lack a 
defined start date, and the demand management actions remain less clear and specific 
than the steps to increase water supply.  The summary includes such disparate elements 
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as “changing cooling systems, modifying tariff system, institutional reform” all within 
the blanket term of “Demand Management actions.”  Surely something as complicated 
and nuanced as “institutional reform” requires its own category and specifications.  Many 
of the suggestions in this phase would greatly improve the efficiency of Jericho’s system 
of allocation; however, the plausibility of these suggestions remains unclear.  Has 
funding been secured for any of these projects?  Will there be any political barriers to 
carrying out these suggestions?  Questions such as these are unanswered at this point, but 
will need to be addressed soon if the proposals are to be taken seriously by the 
Municipality.  
Table 3.5 Long Term Phase Proposals of Master Plan 
Action Objective Starting 
Year 
Construction of gray wastewater 
treatment Plants 
Increase the rate of water reuse for the 
domestic demands 
- 
Demand Management actions 
(changing cooling systems, 
modifying tariff system, 
institutional reform) 
Decrease the domestic demands - 
Network Maintenance Improve the domestic and agricultural 
networks, building reservoirs, installing 
pumps, improve the distribution regimes, 
training technicians, etc 
 
Storm water Harvesting To utilize the storm water in wadis - 
Constriction of Brackish water 
treatment plants 








There is even less specificity in the long-term phase proposals, reflected in Table 3.5 and 
although it is important to maintain flexibility in response, the long term plan needs to 
have much more specific goals and greater scope into the future.  In terms of serious 
planning for the water sector, these “long term” goals are in actuality relatively short-
term in span.  Obviously, actions such as “demand management” and “network 
maintenance” will continue to be relevant and important for long-term planning, but there 
are systematic problems with the allocation system that are left out in this set of 
proposals.  Although the issue of funding underlies the municipality’s ability to tackle all 
of the other main allocation challenges, no solutions are put forth within the Plan to 
address it.  
Challenges to implementing the Master Plan’s Suggestions 
 Although the Master Plan suggests many changes to enhance the operation of the 
system, its plausibility remains low.  Bsharat is pessimistic about the future growth of the 
city and the municipality’s ability to manage that growth and effectively provide 
adequate and constant water access to meet demand.  Although the increased amount of 
tourism is assumed to be good for the economy of Jericho as a whole, it will also put an 
increased strain on the allocation of water as well as complicate the dichotomous 
allocation agreement between agricultural and domestic consumers.  Additionally, 
Bsharat referenced the construction of a training facility that has been operating for the 
past five years in Jericho in which a significant percent of the military and police forces 
of the PA are trained. Because these individuals do directly pay for the water that they 
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consume while at the base, they subsequently pay less attention to their consumption 
patterns and use more than perhaps they would if they were paying for usage.167  The 
same line of reasoning could also be applicable to the consumers in jails, although it is 
probable that the inmates’ access is much more limited and controlled by those other than 
themselves.  However, the presence of the training camp also provides the possibility for 
the municipality to receive special funds from the US and possibly other donors.  The 
Jericho Water Department has applied for aid through the American Consulate because of 
a security agreement between the US and Palestinian Authority.  The US has agreed to 
fund a project constructing 5,000 m
3
 tank and three-kilometer pipeline.  These projects 
are currently being designed through Jericho’s public works department.168 Despite the 
positive elements of such projects, reliance upon foreign aid and prioritizing the goals of 
foreign donors come with a unique set of problems, to be examined in the conclusion. 
 Controlling consumption, which is recognized by Bsharat as the number one 
priority for the water sector, also includes improving the infrastructure of the networks 
and increasing efficiency of those networks.  Because the current network operates on 
more or less a loop, it is difficult to measure consumption and control allocation.  The 
addition of separation valves and the creation of an additional pipeline in the 
topographically higher area in the south of Jericho will help with achieve a more reliable 
and measurable flow. By changing meters so that they measure the volume rather than the 
time used by a consumer, the pricing will more effectively correlate with consumption. 
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“Public awareness” is part of the proposed solution to controlling consumption, but its 
relative importance is downplayed, because changing ingrained mentalities appears to be 
too challenging for the seemingly minimal result.  The implications of this fatalistic 
attitude will be examined further in the conclusion. 
 However, issues of demand cannot be tackled without addressing the other side of 
the equation.  The Plan also aims to increase supply by purchasing additional water rights 
from surrounding areas, such as the recent acquisition of water usage from a neighboring 
spring Ein Ad Duke that will total 20,000 m
3
 a month.169  Despite the optimistic tone of 
the Master Plan, the acquisition of new sources of supply is complicated by the 
interconnectedness of Palestinian water sources and the control thereof with Israeli 
authorities.  While Jericho is less affected by Israel than other areas in the West Bank 
(such as the village of Auja, whose spring has been run almost dry after Israeli drilling in 
the region), there are still significant restrictions on the drilling of new wells and the 
rehabilitation of old wells. 170  According to Bsharat, because of these restrictions, the 
Palestinians are not even consuming the quota allotted to them in Oslo.  Israelis often use 
this statistic to demonstrate the reverse: that the current agreement does not need to be 
increased because the Palestinians have not been using their allotted share.  This is yet 
another example in which the same information yields contradictory interpretations.  
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conducting with their Eco Park at Auja for more details on the situation in Auja, which is partially located 




 According to the framework set up by the Oslo Accords and subsequent 
negotiations, any new projects within Area A locations such as Jericho in the West Bank 
must first be approved by the Joint Water Commission (JWC), whereas laws regarding 
Area C permit no construction whatsoever.  The JWC has never granted permission for 
the drilling of deep wells, and even obtaining the permission to drill a shallow, alluvial 
well can take up to four years.171  These shallow wells generally produce only thirty to 
fifty cubic meters a day, which seems miniscule when compared with the much larger 
output of Ein Sultan.  Any new resources that aim to seriously increase the supply will 
have to supply more than that.  Additionally shallower wells are much more susceptible 
to seasonal variations and their waters tend to be of lesser quality than that found in 
deeper aquifers. Bsharat related an incident in which the municipality received aid from 
American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), a US funding agency, to construct a new 
project in the municipality.  The department had to wait for two years after receiving the 
funding to get approval from the JWC.  Bsharat considered it lucky that they did not lose 
the funds altogether, because often agencies will have a time limit on projects and funds 
released.  The PWA has also been in negotiations to get permission to drill a borehole in 
Jericho, but according to the most recent meeting, which occurred a few weeks prior to 
the interview in January, the JWC had denied the request. 
 The municipality is also involved in a project that will rehabilitate a well 
abandoned by an Israeli settler close to the region, sometimes referred to as “well number 
one.”  The rehabilitation project hopes to mix water from well number one, which has a 
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fairly high salinity content, with the water from Ein Sultan. This project is being funded 
in part by the Japanese and their support for the initial stages of an agro-industrial zone, 
located north of the city. The agreement stipulates that the Japanese will provide 50 m
3
/ 
day, part of which they will be required to share with the Aqbat Jabr refugee camp. Phase 
one of this project has been completed and the municipality is beginning to enter phase 
two, while continuously seeking new donors.  
These short-term projects with a specific goal that are funded by foreign aid demonstrate 
one of the main problems of Jericho’s water system.  The projects are only possible 
because of foreign aid, and must therefore fit both within the narrow scope of the funding 
cycle, and reflect the goals of the donor state or organization.  Without a steady flow of 
internally generated revenue, the city will continue to experience the same difficulties 
within the water sector, or possibly even worse as the city experiences more 
unsustainable growth.  Essentially, what was gained by the creation of the Plan was a 
comprehensive overview that pinpointed the many problems within the system.  The 
changes necessary in order to not only fix the problems as they exist today, but plan for 





 In many ways, the case of Jericho’s water supply illustrates a basic challenge of 
democratization and state building: how to acknowledge and respect informal institutions 
that sustained a community for millennia, yet make necessary changes for future 
development.  While Jericho was never formally a colony, the vestiges of foreign 
sovereignties from the Ottomans to British, Jordanians and Israelis have nonetheless 
affected the city and its water operations. Although some efforts were made during the 
late Ottoman era to reform both land and water ownership and taxation in the area, no 
serious reform efforts occurred until the Mandate period.  British plans to drastically 
improve and “modernize” Jericho’s irrigation and agricultural practice yielded little 
success save some repairs to the system of aqueducts.  Jordanian rule generated a brief 
economic boom, but these changes did not develop real infrastructure in Jericho, as the 
local leadership was dominated by royalists.  Israeli rule saw the development of some 
municipal institutions and city utilities, even if this period was also one of increased 
limitations on Palestinian agricultural and water use in Jericho.  After centuries of foreign 
rule, eighteen years of Palestinian self-governance has hardly been sufficient for Jericho 
to create and manage its own infrastructure for efficient, economic, and equitable water 
allocation. 
 Efforts to reform and institutionalize water allocation that were made under 
foreign rule consistently disregarded the local informal institutions eventually proved to 
be failures.  The British attempted to impose their agricultural “expertise” and “modern” 
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irrigation schemes learned in other parts of the Empire onto the perceived “backward” 
fellahin techniques practiced by the Palestinian farmer, which, in actuality, were often 
more suitable for the terrain than the proposed solutions of the British.  Not only did 
these British initiatives fail to significantly change practices in Palestine, but their 
research facilities were also highly visible and easily targeted symbols of an unwanted 
British presence.  This rejection is typical of the distrust that foreign institutions have 
received within the city’s water sector. Although Jericho is currently classified as Area A, 
a municipality completely under Palestinian control; the Israeli Occupation remains a 
serious and daily challenge to the municipality’s ability to function as a independent 
government.  Despite the changes in formal laws and nominal ruling forces, informal 
social agreements and frameworks of allocation have continued into the present day. 
 Although Jericho has not flourished, it has been incredibly resilient throughout the 
millennia of its existence. Ein Sultan and its abundant waters, and the framework of 
informal institutions able to locally govern how water is used in the community have 
been central to this resilience. Within a small irrigation community that collectively 
shares its water resources, such as Jericho, the individuals will be more likely to consider 
the entire community and share the burden of droughts and the bounty of surpluses 
among all its members.172  A common element in the ruling policy of each of the outside 
governments that ruled Jericho was their failure to consider these existing local 
institutions and their importance to the community and its system of allocation. 
                                                 
172 Trottier, Allocating and Managing Water for a Sustainable Future. 9. 
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Respect of local institutions often prevents any sectorial reallocation of water 
from irrigation to domestic use in cities for example. Treating water as a public 
good often leads us to call for such a reallocation on the ground of sound 
economic use. The full impact of such a reallocation must be evaluated though. It 
would entail the disappearance of local institutions whose resilience has ensured 
the security of their communities while simultaneously disrupting the livelihoods 
of these community members.173 
 
Jericho’s informal institutions have survived throughout the changes in ruling structure, 
and while they can be resilient to economic and environmental challenges, they also can 
be resistant to useful change. This is obvious when looking at the power that the Ein 
Sultan Water Users Association and their constituency of traditionally powerful 
agricultural elite continues to wield in the water allocation decisions of Jericho today. 
 Whereas foreign rule ignored these informal institutions, the Palestinian sector is 
dominated by them.  Jericho needs to reach a happy medium in which the legitimacy and 
importance of organizations such as ESWUA are recognized, but public processes have 
enough power and legitimacy to overrule the decisions of these institutions when 
necessary for the advancement of the water allocation system and, by extension, the city 
as a whole.  The framework for allocation that is currently stuck at a forty-two percent for 
domestic use and fifty-eight percent for agricultural allocation restricts future flexibility 
and is not based on any set of guiding principles, thus hindering future development.  
Given that any decisions to change the status quo would require some politically 
unpopular decisions and enforcement, it is unlikely that such change will occur in the 
near future.  In the meantime, the plan seems to be to operate within this limiting 
framework and improve the system as much as possible without a complete overhaul. 




 The Jericho Master Plan is the third such master plan that the PHG has conducted; 
it also created plans for Tulkarm and Tubas in the northern West Bank.  While the 
Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) organizes more general reports about the state of 
water consumption and allocation in the West Bank, it lacks the resources to carry out 
detailed studies such as these master plans for all of the areas it controls, or the territory 
as a whole. The central office of the PWA lacks the resources and institutional capacity to 
carry out planning on a scale similar to its Israeli counterparts.  A generally unpopular 
public office, the head of the PWA must negotiate within the Joint Water Commission 
(JWC) and obtain Israeli permission for any number of small to large-scale projects in the 
territories.  If maintaining and repairing existing systems are so difficult and time-
consuming, then it is obviously improbable that the agency will be able to focus on long-
term planning, or be able to seriously tackle consumption attitudes and patterns.  
Therefore, these research and planning responsibilities fall to local authorities and 
nongovernmental organizations, such as the PHG.  While the services these organizations 
offer are crucial and much needed, they lack the level legitimacy and enforcement 
capabilities that a strong government utility would be able to offer.  The official 
Palestinian institutions are also less than two decades old; hopefully, with time they will 
gain legitimacy and experience. 
 The engineering solutions proposed by the PHG and the Master Plan will 
undoubtedly improve the system of water allocation in Jericho if successfully 
implemented. However, these solutions will not be enough to adequately address rising 
demands in the future.  Because of its relative per capita water wealth compared to other 
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Palestinian cities, Jericho has been able to avoid rationing that exists in many other 
Palestinian cities, especially during the summer months. There is a fear that if the growth 
in Jericho continues, then the city will be forced to enforce similar rationing measures, 
even after the technological advances made from the suggestions of the Master Plan.174  
If the proposed changes encounter some challenge and are not carried out, Jericho will be 
at an even greater risk of shortages in the future. At the same time, officials and engineers 
place little value in education and the conservation potential with raising public 
awareness.  While there is a place for public awareness in the Master Plan, the main 
vehicle for change remains purely technical solutions.  
 Laying out concrete and measurable goals and plans for increasing the supply is 
much easier than establishing achievable and much needed institutional changes of 
consumption patterns.  The plans for increasing efficiency and extending water supplies 
are very specific, detailing achievable goals for the near future, such as: the construction 
of gray water treatment plants beginning by 2012, storm water harvesting from the wadis 
by 2015 and brackish groundwater treatment plants by 2015.  On the other hand, the 
short-term, mid-term and long-term plans for “Demand Management actions” remain 
vague, with no clear start date or measurable objectives.175  This is a prime example in 
which effective environmental communication strategies could be employed in order to 
better decrease demand and begin to change restrictive institutional frameworks and 
established behaviors.  If the gauge of prosperity in Jericho continues to be measured by 
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owning private pools and extensive private gardens, then increasing affluence and 
population growth will further increase the stresses on the system. Although planners are 
wise not to champion pubic awareness as a “silver bullet” capable of solving all of the 
municipality’s allocation problems, communication could nonetheless play an important 
role in managing demand. 
 As a point of reference, Israel has encouraged an atmosphere of extremely 
conscious water consumption, utilizing public ad campaigns, environmental education 
programs and social pressure. This is, of course, not to suggest that the methods used in 
Israel to decrease consumption should be simply pasted onto the completely different 
situation of Jericho. Cultural differences and attitudes need to be considered carefully, 
and any efforts at changing consumption habits would need to come from within the 
community itself.  The issue of creatively addressing water demands could benefit from 
what Ramirez and Quarry call a “champion,” an individual dedicated to not only the 
success and outcome of a project but also the process of communication as a whole.176  
The engineers in the field are highly dedicated but do not place much faith in 
communication, most likely because the scope of the immediate technical challenges and 
shortcomings of the network seem to trump any such “soft” solutions.  It is difficult to be 
overly concerned with changing attitudes toward conspicuous consumption when such 
rudimentary problems such as pump failures and the lack of a wastewater plant seem 
more immediate and obvious problems. 
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 Another challenge of the Master Plan is the time span of the goals.  Like most 
donor-funded projects, the scope is necessarily limited to several years, after which the 
projects can be evaluated and progress can be measured.  In contrast, Israel’s water sector 
(formerly known as the office of the Water Commissioner and recently reorganized as the 
Water Authority) has a Master Plan that considers all aspects of water management for 
the immediate and long-term future.  Their long term planning, such as the building of 
desalination plants and network infrastructure, considers the water needs of the state and 
its neighbors for the next fifty years or longer.177  Perhaps, in some ways, the narrow 
scope of its projects could be seen as a positive aspect for Jericho and the Palestinian 
Authority as a whole.  Without the many levels of bureaucracy, it may be able to be more 
flexible, and not be confined by the institutionalization and red tape of their counterparts 
across the Green Line.  However, these benefits would be minor at best.  The inability of 
Jericho to plan for more than its immediate water needs will only increase the problems 
of the city with time. Jericho requires serious long term planning, but the problem of 
funding necessarily complicates its ability to do so.  An overhaul of the tariff system, 
although not politically popular, could possibly allow the municipality to gain more 
revenue and control consumption at once.  
 Although it can be useful to compare the situations in Israel and the West Bank, it 
is also important to remember that the historical and social specificities of the region, as 
has been demonstrated in the first chapters of this case study, make the context of 
Palestine unique; and Jericho represents a distinct subset of those conditions. It would be 
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unwise to simply transplant the methodologies and institutions of one state onto the 
different context of another.  The concrete and psychological vestiges of Occupation in 
Jericho remain real barriers to the success of Palestinian self-control of their water 
resources.  Actors in the Palestinian water sector are paradoxically both dependent upon 
Israeli support and are limited by Israeli constraints.  Although Jericho is hypothetically a 
self-controlled Palestinian municipality, it operates within a framework in which it has 
little voice or control. Jericho is surrounded by large amounts of territory, even within its 
own governate, which is partially or completely dominated by Israeli rule. 
 Instead of relying on steady, internally generated utility fees for service or tax 
revenue, the official and nongovernmental actors in the water sector alike must rely on 
the unpredictable flows of foreign aid.  The international aid flowing into the West Bank 
is often allocated specifically for the construction of wells, which can lead to over-
extraction and unsustainable consumption from an aquifer.178 Donors generally like to 
fund projects that have tangible and measurable results; however, this practice creates an 
unsustainable allocation situation and prioritizes short-term results at the cost of lasting 
solutions. Funding the drilling of new wells requires that the municipality navigate the 
lengthy bureaucratic process of gaining permission through the JWC.  Despite these 
frustrations, Jericho and other Palestinian municipalities that are struggling with limited 
funds, will unlikely turn down any aid that offers even temporary or unsustainable 
solutions.  By revising its methods for collecting internal revenue, perhaps Jericho would 
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be able accept aid only when furthering its own projects, so that it is can assert its own 
priorities rather than being subject to the whims of donors. 
 The lack of overarching unity within the West Bank and the unique situations of 
the villages, towns and cities within it demonstrate a real challenge to state and 
institutional capacity building. The local “grassroots” organizations that address water 
issues exist independently of one another and have been developed with unique sets of 
norms and practices that have not only contributed to their impressive lasting power, but 
which also make it difficult for the PA to develop an overarching system for 
regulation.179  Small-scale efforts at centralizing and consolidating power, such as the 
Master Plan, which will provide some structure and short-term planning to an 
unorganized department, have a restricted reach. There are limitations on what can be 
accomplished within this local framework.  The success of informal allocation 
institutions and “irrigation communities,” such as have existed in Jericho throughout the 
changes of formal leadership, provide a measure of legitimacy and trust among the 
population, despite the unfairness that can result from them.  However, at the same time, 
residents are now expecting that the PA can provide water for domestic consumption 
without interfering with these informal institutions.   
 While the two systems of allocation are not inherently incompatible, both 
irrigators and Jericho’s water administrators could benefit from some measure of give 
and take.  The state needs to recognize the legitimacy of these informal institutions, and 
the irrigation communities need to recognize that agriculture no longer plays as central of 
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a role in Jericho as it did in the past, and cede control of some of the resources 
accordingly. If any future Palestinian state hopes to replicate the successes of informal 
systems through the centralization of power and institutionalization, it must consider both 
the successes and failures of these local efforts to negotiate this difficult gray zone. 
Informal institutions sometimes have formally recognized representative bodies such as 
the ESWUA in Jericho, but other times are not so clearly articulated. Either way, 
recognizing their social, political and economic power within the community as a tool for 
the formal to gain legitimacy will be essential for the success of water allocation 
improvement in a future Palestinian state.  This balance has yet to be achieved in Jericho, 
but the coming years should prove to what extent the municipality has been able to 
implement structural and taxation changes necessary for the success of the water sector 
and the prosperity of the city. 
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Appendix: List of Active and Proposed PWA Projects in Jericho 
 
Active Projects in Jericho as of 2009 
 
Source: Palestinian Water Authority: Palestinian Water and Wastewater Sectors. “Basic 




 Proposed Projects of the PWA in Jericho as of 2009  
 
Source: Palestinian Water Authority: Palestinian Water and Wastewater Sectors. “Basic 
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